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ABSTRACT
This Symposium Article explores the origins and limits of the federal
government’s interstate quarantine power. In the event of a public health
emergency, state and local political boundaries may generate self-interested
measures that risk substantial harm to neighboring states. To more effectively
stem a national epidemic and to better protect the interests of regional
populations, should the federal government step in to override a state’s
protective quarantine? Neither current statutory authority nor how we have
thought about it in the past prevents a greater national role. This Article shows
how to expand our view of the federal government’s interstate quarantine
authority as an important tool to respond to public health threats affecting
more than one state.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 Thrower Symposium provided an early opportunity to discuss
the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) new
quarantine regulations.1 In this Symposium issue, James Misrahi recounts the
history of these regulations in his article The CDC’s Communicable Disease
Regulations: Striking the Balance Between Public Health & Individual Rights,
and responds to criticisms by some scholars concerning civil rights
protections.2 Although this Article also addresses the new federal quarantine
regulations, the aim is different. This Article considers the concept of interstate
quarantine, an aspect of the federal government’s authority that remains
perplexing, and is seldom considered by scholars.3 This is the authority of the
federal government to act within the United States, not its well-settled
authority to quarantine travelers arriving at a U.S. point of entry.
Following Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Ebola,
scholars have addressed questions surrounding the legal basis for quarantine,
including ethical responsibilities and preparedness.4 Headlines from the recent

1
Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 70–71). Originally intended to become final on February 21, 2017, the effective date was pushed to March
21, 2017, to allow for review by the Trump Administration. Rob Stein, CDC Seeks Controversial New
Quarantine Powers to Stop Outbreaks, NPR (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/02/02/512678115/cdc-seeks-controversial-new-quarantine-powers-to-stop-outbreaks; see Control
of Communicable Diseases; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,718, 10,719 (Feb. 15, 2017). The notice
of delay was published in the Federal Register on February 15, 2017. See Control of Communicable Diseases;
Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. at 10,718–19 (“This action is undertaken in accordance with the
memorandum of January 20, 2017 from the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff entitled ‘Regulatory
Freeze Pending Review.’”).
2
James Misrahi, The CDC’s Communicable Disease Regulations: Striking the Balance Between
Public Health & Individual Rights, 67 EMORY L.J. 463 (2018).
3
An exception is Eang L. Ngov, Under Containment: Preempting State Ebola Quarantine
Regulations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2015), in which Ngov argues in favor of preemption in the context of Ebola.
Another recent treatment is Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for
Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227 (2015). Rothstein identifies the problem, see id. at 256, but
his purpose was not to suggest a change of structure, but rather how to make the existing fragmented system
work better. I explain how my views differ in Part V.
4
See, e.g., Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past
and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53 (2007); Christine Coughlin, Public Health Policy: Revisiting the Need for a
Compensation System for Quarantine to Maximize Compliance, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 415 (2017);
Roni Adil Elias, Preventing Contagion and Protecting Civil Liberties: Problems in Quarantine & Isolation
Law in the United States & Suggestions for Reform, 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 135 (2016); Rothstein, supra note
3; Nazita Gamini, Note, The Need for Stronger Implementation of Quarantine Laws: How Adopting China’s
Strategy to Fight SARS Can Help the United States Effectively Utilize Quarantine Powers in the Fight Against
Ebola, 11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 57 (2015); Anna L. Grilley, Comment, Arbitrary, Unnecessary
Quarantine: Building International and National Infrastructures to Protect Human Rights During Public
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Ebola crisis and the specter of pandemic disease arriving in the United States
from elsewhere in the world inevitably have focused public attention on
quarantine at U.S. borders, particularly the role of the CDC to interdict
contagious disease before it can enter the territorial United States.5 But this
focus on border control masks concern for epidemic outbreaks within the
United States, at least with respect to the federal government’s quarantine
authority. Unlike the Ebola outbreak, in which the U.S. border was the primary
focus, this Article concerns federal government authority when a contagious
disease already present in the United States threatens to reach epidemic level.
The United States is dangerously handicapped and unprepared to effectively
control transmission from state to state, especially when individual states take
actions that benefit it but harm their neighbors.
As this Article will explain, state and local governments lack sufficient
incentives to cooperate effectively with each other to stem a public health
emergency of potentially wide geographic scope. These separate public health
authorities, in fact, may face the opposite incentive. State lines demarking
political units present challenges in the face of a potential national epidemic.
Much is made of the need for local preparedness, including resource planning,
simulations, and drills, but little has been done on a regional or multi-state
basis.6
Moreover, even if incentives not to cooperate with adjacent governments
can be overcome, individual states lack the administrative and enforcement
tools necessary to effectively contain the spread of disease from one state to
another. This is one aspect of the problem of fragmentation of the public health
system in the United States that I have identified elsewhere.7

Health Emergencies, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 914 (2016); Carrie Lacey, Note, Abuse of Quarantine Authority: The
Case for a Federal Approach to Infectious Disease Containment, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 199 (2003).
5
Protecting Borders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/about/ebola/
protecting-borders.html (last updated July 9, 2015).
6
An important exception is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a state-to-state mutual
aid system authorized by Congress to coordinate voluntary assistance from one state to another in the event of
a natural disaster or other emergency. See generally EMAC Legislation, EMERGENCY MGMT. ASSISTANCE
COMPACT, https://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learn-about-emac/emac-legislation (last visited Dec. 8, 2017)
(describing compact and authorizing legislation). As I discuss further in the Conclusion, however, this
Compact does not contemplate the coordination of state and local quarantine policy.
7
Polly J. Price, Sovereignty, Citizenship, and Public Health in the United States, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 919, 947–51 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Sovereignty]; Polly J. Price, Opinion, If Tuberculosis
Spreads . . ., N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/opinion/if-tuberculosis-spreads.
html [hereinafter Price, If Tuberculosis Spreads . . .].
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My purpose is to shift the debate about the federal government’s
quarantine authority from its focus on international borders to the interior, and
to point out the dangers of protectionism when state and local governments
attempt to exclude outside threats from local communities. Our longstanding
view of a restricted federal interstate quarantine authority reflects an
unnecessarily restrained view of what Congress has authorized. The CDC
believes it is more constrained by underlying principles of federalism than it in
fact is.
I view the new federal quarantine regulations as a missed opportunity to
clarify the meaning of “interstate quarantine” both as a matter of jurisdiction
and practical application, recognizing that to do so was almost certainly
deemed politically inexpedient, and would have hampered the acceptability of
these much-needed updates to federal quarantine rules. But such discussion is
not foreclosed for the future. Congress has provided ample room for the
exercise of interstate quarantine authority, sufficient even to nullify a stateordered quarantine.
An expanded federal interstate quarantine authority could alleviate harmful
and counterproductive parochial interests originating at state and local political
levels. State public health departments have extensive legal authority to order
quarantine, isolation, disclosure of personal information and contacts, and
travel restrictions. But state lines can make a public health emergency worse,
and at present there is little that can be done to prevent the modern-day
equivalent of the “shotgun quarantine,” a chaotic period in U.S. history that
devastated lives and commerce in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.8 It is instructive to remember this episode and the harm caused by a
weak federal authority hamstrung to remedy the situation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with brief illustrations to
portray the need for clearer lines of quarantine authority, and greater federal
authority, in the event of a public health emergency involving multiple states.
An epidemic within the nation may require a national quarantine policy to
counteract harmful or ineffectual state and local quarantine.
Part II examines the statutory basis for federal interstate quarantine, noting
that the new federal quarantine rules neither expand nor contract that statutory
authority. Statutory authority already exists for preemption of state quarantine
laws, even if the political will to assert it has been lacking.

8

See infra Section IV.B.
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Part III explains the historical background of federal interstate quarantine
in the 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act, when Congress provided federal authority
to act in the midst of yellow fever epidemics. Congress did so in response to
requests from states that they be protected from harmful quarantines imposed
by other state and local governments. But practical limitations prevented
significant federal intervention. Congress has not re-evaluated the federal
government’s interstate quarantine authority since the last congressional debate
on this subject in 1906.9
This Article concludes by drawing these elements together to argue that the
federal quarantine statute’s language is sufficiently broad to authorize
significant federal intervention in matters of state and local quarantine, and that
there is no constitutional impediment to do so. We should think hard about
how best to use federal interstate quarantine capability to respond more
effectively to public health threats. Such authority has not been needed on a
large scale in more than a century, but scientists predict a widespread,
devastating epidemic is all but certain in the future. We should plan for federal
preemption of state and local quarantines in the event such authority is needed
to mount an effective national response in the future.
I.

FEDERAL QUARANTINE POWER IN THE INTERIOR: “INTERSTATE” AND
INTERDEPENDENCE

A. Quarantine and Isolation as Public Health Tools
Quarantine and isolation as public health tools have a long history in the
United States.10 Both are used to protect the public by preventing exposure to
people who may be infected with a contagious disease. Isolation is used to
separate ill persons who have a communicable disease from those who are
healthy.11 Isolation may involve confinement to a healthcare facility or at
home.12 Quarantine, on the other hand, separates and restricts the movement of
people who are not sick, but who may have been exposed to a communicable
disease.13 These people may not know they have been exposed to a disease,

9

See infra Section IV.D.
See generally Batlan, supra note 4 (recounting the history of quarantine in the United States); Alfred
J. Sciarrino, The Grapes of Wrath & the Speckled Monster (Epidemics, Biological Terrorism and the Early
Legal History of Two Major Defenses—Quarantine and Vaccination), 7 J. MED. & L. 117 (2003) (same).
11
Quarantine and Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http:www.cdc.gov/
quarantine (last updated Sept. 29, 2017).
12
Id.
13
Id.
10
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may have the disease but not show symptoms, may develop the disease at a
later date, or they may never develop the disease at all.
Quarantine can be imposed on specific individuals or on entire groups.
Over the last century, involuntary quarantine has been relatively rare in the
United States; it is used today primarily in individual cases of non-compliant
tuberculosis (TB) patients.14 Voluntary quarantine and isolation are more
common, as patients who are sick willingly comply in order to get better.15
Many public health officials prefer more modern (and less threatening)
terminology such as “preventive monitoring,” “preventive observation,” and
“social distancing” measures instead of the term “quarantine.”
Whenever they can, public health professionals seek voluntary compliance
with quarantine or isolation orders. Absent voluntary compliance, state
authority to impose quarantine is substantial. In some states, the public health
department must first apply for a court order.16 In other states, as is the case for
the federal government, a public health quarantine order is self-executing.17
When an individual or group will not comply voluntarily, public health officers
may enlist law enforcement to carry out the order.18
A quarantine may also cover a geographic area. A prohibition against
persons entering or leaving a defined boundary is an example of a geographic
or area quarantine. Known as a cordon sanitaire, this “zone” quarantine is a
barrier implemented to stop the spread of infectious disease, usually by a
guarded line.19 An area quarantine might be used, for example, to separate a

14
For an overview of federal quarantine authority exercised through a “Do Not Board” list, see Federal
Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1009 (2008). I
explain in detail the application of federal quarantine authority in the context of tuberculosis in an article
prepared for the U.S.-Mexico Border Health Commission. Polly J. Price, Tuberculosis Control Laws in the
U.S.-Mexico Border Region: Legal Framework in the United States 7–8 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 15-371 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2709829; see also Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 965–73.
15
See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2014)
(“Federal [q]uarantine [r]arely used”); State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.
aspx (“Public health quarantine and isolation are legal authorities that may be, but rarely are, implemented to
prevent the spread of communicable diseases.”).
16
See State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, supra note 15 (listing state laws and describing range of
authority).
17
See id. (listing Arizona, Arkansas, and Georgia as examples of states with self-executing quarantine
orders).
18
See generally id. (listing state laws and describing range of authority).
19
Rothstein, supra note 3, at 235.
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group of persons who may have been exposed to a disease until it can be
determined that they are not ill. The cordon sanitaire is intended to protect a
community from contagion by preventing the entry of anyone or anything.
Such quarantines raise serious ethical and human rights issues.20
All U.S. states provide for isolation or quarantine by statute.21 Quarantine
of persons without symptoms can take a variety of forms, ranging from
confinement at home or in a facility, to less onerous travel and social
distancing restrictions with self-reported symptoms.22 Individuals have rights
to due process of law, and generally, isolation or quarantine must be carried
out in the least restrictive setting necessary to maintain public health.23 On the
other hand, societal rights are also significant—namely, a right to be protected
from individuals who pose public health threats. Courts weigh these interests
when conflicts between individuals and government authority occur.
Involuntary quarantine is a drastic curtailment of civil liberties for the benefit
of the public at large, and thus its use is generally considered a tool of last
recourse.24
For any quarantine, the government must show (1) a public health
necessity, (2) an intervention that is both effective and demonstrates a
reasonable connection between means and ends, (3) proportionality (i.e., that
the intervention is neither too broadly nor too narrowly tailored), and (4) that
the quarantine or isolation is in the least restrictive setting while accomplishing
its purpose.25 State governments are under no obligation to compensate
quarantined persons for lost income, business disruption, or other economic
harms.26
20
Rachel Kaplan Hoffmann & Keith Hoffmann, Ethical Considerations in the Use of Cordons
Sanitaire, CLINICAL CORRELATIONS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.clinicalcorrelations.org/?p=8357.
21
See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 15; State Quarantine and Isolation
Statutes, supra note 15.
22
A CDC guide to state Ebola protocols provides examples of the range of state responses to quarantine
and monitoring of persons who may have been exposed to Ebola but show no symptoms. See Interim Table of
State Ebola Screening and Monitoring Policies for Asymptomatic Individuals, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/interim-ebolascreening.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
23
See Katye M. Jobe, Comment, The Constitutionality of Quarantine and Isolation Orders in an Ebola
Epidemic and Beyond, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 165, 180 (2016).
24
See Michelle A. Daubert, Comment, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting
Liberty Through A Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2007) (“Both isolation
and quarantine severely curtail the freedom of individuals to whom they are applied. Thus, they are often tools
of last resort because they require the separation of infected and potentially infected persons from the public
through confinement to treatment facilities, residences, and other locations.”).
25
Id. at 1310.
26
See Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Job Security and Income Replacement for Individuals
in Quarantine: The Need for Legislation, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 239, 244 (2007).
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Legal recourse to challenge a public health order, when available, comes
later in the process, usually after an isolation or quarantine order already has
been implemented. Public health officials have extensive legal authority to
respond quickly.27 Judges have limited jurisdiction to provide immediate relief,
and may be inclined to defer to medical experts on the need for emergency
measures.28
But what if public health authorities overreact, and place large numbers of
persons who are not a threat into involuntary quarantine? Or enact a cordon
sanitaire to protect a community from outside intercourse, in the hope that
such geographic exclusion will prevent entrance of the disease?
For any use of quarantine on a large scale, the basic problem is this: In the
midst of an epidemic, the public will tend to overestimate the degree of risk,
leading to poor policy results, including inequitable allocation of medical
resources, ineffective and economically harmful prevention measures, and
deep suspicion of government’s ability to control the spread of disease. Public
fear also leads to easy scapegoating of minority groups.29 Inevitably, the initial
response to a pandemic threat from abroad is to seal the borders—an
unworkable national security strategy that reroutes essential public resources
away from domestic prevention and treatment. Borders inevitably are porous,
even when travelers are individually screened at a port of entry.
State and local governments reflect this impulse as well, but with greater
consequences. States have traditional authority over all issues of public health
within their borders.30 Political boundaries are smaller and local politicians are
more directly responsive to their electorate. At the same time, state and local
jurisdictions have limited medical and scientific resources to understand the

27
See, for example, Georgia’s public health emergency legislation, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 et seq.
(West Supp. 2017).
28
See, e.g., STATE OF UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS OF RESTRICTION 12
(2008) (providing for up to ten days before an order of restriction hearing is required).
29
See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (quarantining an entire area of San
Francisco where Asians lived; order lifted by a federal court under the equal protection clause). More recently,
group scapegoating through fear was evident in the AIDS epidemic. See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and
Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 53–54 (1985) (“Public health
officials have begun to draft or to consider drafting quarantine regulations applicable to AIDS, and public
figures, from conservative religious leaders to members of the medical professions, have called for the
isolation of some victims or carriers of the disease.”).
30
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
87 (3d ed. 2016) (“States and localities have had primary responsibility for protecting the public’s health since
the founding of the republic.”); Price, If Tuberculosis Spreads . . . , supra note 7 (arguing that the CDC should
enter this area of traditional state function to provide better services and funding).
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transmission of complex diseases and to form independent judgments about the
best means to control them. State governments, then, are especially prone to
problems of politically driven reaction to an epidemic threat, including overly
restrictive and counterproductive use of quarantine. Such actions have real
potential to impose disproportionate harm on neighboring states and regions, in
addition to exacerbating problems for that state’s own residents.
B. State Quarantines Harming Neighbors: Two Hypotheticals
Two hypothetical situations illustrate when greater federal control of
interstate quarantine may be desirable. Both scenarios illustrate opportunities
for greater federal control over a state-imposed quarantine when a national
quarantine policy might be needed. We assume for both scenarios that the
governor has specifically invoked quarantine or public health emergency
authority existing by statute.31
1. Scenario One: When Returning Travelers “Enter” Both the United
States and a State
For the first hypothetical, assume the following. A highly contagious
hemorrhagic virus, previously unknown to scientists, strikes three countries in
South America, leading the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare an
international public health emergency. While U.S. citizens visiting or living in
those countries make arrangements to return to the United States, hundreds of
volunteer healthcare professionals from the United States arrive in those
countries, serving on average for two weeks treating patients.
According to the CDC, returning travelers from these countries can be
declared free from the virus after five days, and after that time pose no risk of
spreading the disease to others. Accordingly, CDC quarantine officers,
working together with Customs and Border Protection (CBP), institute a
screening process to identify potential carriers. Likely exposure is determined

31
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, proposed in 2001, is designed primarily to address
public health emergencies such as virus outbreaks or bioterrorism. Model State Emergency Health Powers Act,
AM. C. L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act (last visited Nov. 24,
2017). As of 2007, thirty-three states had introduced 133 legislative bills related to the articles or sections of
the Act. See Ctr. for Law & the Pub.’s Health, The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act: State
Legislative Update Table (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/
MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160623112309/http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
Resources/ResourcesPDFs/MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf]. Of these, forty-eight bills or resolutions had passed.
See id.; see also Responsibilities in a Public Health Emergency, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/public-health-chart.aspx.
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by travel history and occupation: this includes all medical professionals who
have worked with patients, but also other returning U.S. citizens who cannot
show that they have been in a disease-free area for more than five days. For
such persons, the CDC issues a quarantine order requiring them to remain at
home for five days, checking temperature twice daily with home visits or video
monitoring. Other nations employ similar quarantine practices, and to date,
there has been no instance of disease transmission outside of the three affected
countries.
The governors of two U.S. states with major international airports,
however, have publicly questioned this protocol. They claim, without
providing any evidence, that the protocol puts residents of their states at
tremendous risk, and that the CDC cannot be trusted to provide competent
information. They demand more stringent, drastic measures for travelers
returning from these countries.
Specifically, Governor X declares a public health emergency, ordering all
returning travelers from affected countries into three weeks of confinement,
under guard, in a state-owned building near the airport. Governor Y quickly
follows suit, but in addition orders that any healthcare professional who treated
patients may not enter that state until he or she has spent thirty days in a nonaffected country. Governor Y cites the cost of quarantine for returning health
workers as justification for the territorial ban.
As it turns out, both governors are up for re-election soon. Their actions
both respond to and exacerbate panic among the population. Although
scientists and medical professionals reassure the public that the disease is not
easily spread and can be contained effectively by home isolation, schools close
and many venues cancel sporting events and concerts.
The governors frankly admit that their orders are designed to dissuade
medical professionals from flying into and out of their state airports. Litigation
challenging these orders begins, but most experts agree a court is unlikely to
invalidate them immediately, if at all, even though courts will consider
individual cases via habeas jurisdiction as well as entertain lawsuits for
damages after the crisis has passed.
But jurisdictional problems arise at the international airports in both states.
The governors insist that CDC quarantine officers change their screening
protocol to match the stringent new state standards, and that they identify and
hand over to state officials any traveler from these countries for immediate
quarantine. In addition, Governor Y demands that all returning healthcare
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workers be placed on the federal Do Not Board list, to prevent air travel into
the state entirely. No other state governors make such a demand; other states
generally follow CDC recommendations.
In the face of the governors’ demands, the Surgeon General and the
Director of the CDC must decide whether to modify their protocol at the
international airports in these two states. Because international arrivals do not
officially “enter” the United States or any U.S. state until they have cleared
customs and have been given permission to enter by CBP,32 CDC quarantine
officers have final authority to screen travelers and issue health orders as
appropriate, prior to anyone being admitted to the United States. If the CDC
were to change its quarantine protocol to comply with the quarantine orders of
these two states, CDC officials would have to issue three-week quarantine
orders, and then either transport the quarantined individual directly to the
state’s confinement facility or remand them to state custody at the airport.
The CDC stands its ground, citing overwhelming scientific evidence that
such stringent quarantine practices are unnecessary. CBP refuses to identify to
state officials those travelers who have arrived from the affected countries and
have cleared the CDC’s health screening process. The decision to enforce only
the federal quarantine protocol was made partly at the behest of neighboring
states, where the services of their returning health professionals are urgently
needed.
Because state health officers thus have no way to distinguish travelers from
affected countries versus travelers from elsewhere, state officials set up a
screening process for all returning passengers, just past the “Welcome to the
United States” sign. At this checkpoint, all travelers must produce their
arriving flight information. Those from countries where the virus is suspected
or is already present are then taken into state custody for quarantine, even if the
CDC concluded they posed no risk or could be monitored via self-isolation at
home.
2. Scenario Two: Guarded Quarantine Lines at State Borders
This time, assume that the viral hemorrhagic disease described in scenario
one has spread domestically, with dozens of cases reported in the United
States. The disease is not yet present in state X. To prevent the disease from
entering state X, the Governor, invoking emergency health powers, shuts down
32
See Applying for Admission into United States, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Mar. 10,
2015), https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/applying-admission-united-states.
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travel and commercial transport from neighboring states where the disease is
present.
Two medical supply companies are located in state X. Company A, the
primary maker of protective suits for medical workers, has its distribution
center for these and other critical medical supplies in this state. Nearby,
Company B has a stockpile of vaccines, which although prepared for a
different disease are thought to be effective against the new threat. This area
quarantine prevents the medical supplies and vaccines from leaving the state,
making them exclusively available to that state’s residents. The travel
restriction also has the effect of disrupting food and water transport throughout
the region.
Urgent calls from neighboring governors are unheeded, with the Governor
of state X explaining that this is a temporary measure, to be reassessed at a
later date. Governor X also exercises public health emergency powers to
commandeer for purchase both Company A’s and Company B’s medical
supplies, which are then distributed to state X’s residents according to its
health department’s protocol. Although this aspect of the travel ban benefits
the state’s residents, they are harmed in other ways, including transport of food
from a large distribution center just outside state lines.
In legal terms, one state has declared a quarantine against another state,
prohibiting incoming or outgoing travel and transport of goods. This
prohibition against persons entering or leaving at a defined boundary is an
example of a geographic or area quarantine—a cordon sanitaire.
To summarize this second hypothetical:
(1) One state declares quarantine against another, prohibiting
incoming travel and transport of goods to prevent disease from
entering the state. This prohibition against persons entering the
state would include its own returning citizens, effectively limiting
their travel.
(2) The state quarantine prevents movement out in a way that also
hoards food, medicine, vaccine supplies urgently needed
elsewhere, and other vital goods previously shared via the normal
workings of a free market.
The motivation need not be intentional self-interest. The population’s fear of
contagion may override a state government’s ability to keep travel and
commerce open, even in limited fashion.
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C. Why Courts Are an Insufficient Remedy: The Example of State Ebola
Quarantines
The geographic or area quarantines described in scenario two have no
modern-day counterpart in the United States.33 But the United States
experienced something very much like this during epidemics of yellow fever
around the turn of the twentieth century. This historical precedent, the
precursor to the modern federal quarantine statute, is explored in Part IV. For
now, it is sufficient to note that the specter of armed guards at state lines or
other geographic areas is not only imaginable, but probably “legal” for a period
of time, absent direct federal intervention.34 The judiciary—whether state or
federal—is unlikely to serve as an effective brake on overreaching state
quarantines, at least within the time frame in which such intervention would
have practical effect.
While Part III revisits interstate issues arising from a geographic
quarantine, this section focuses on scenario one—the quarantine of travelers
returning from abroad, when state and federal rules differ. The quarantine of
returning travelers in the first scenario is recognizable as a variation of actual
events during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Ebola presented a unique situation
because the disease takes up to three weeks to develop after exposure,
requiring lengthy quarantine or observation of people who were exposed but
not sick.35 This is because usually no symptoms appear between exposure and
the onset of illness, the point at which Ebola is known to be contagious to
others.36 A key question for public health officials became what to do with
these people during the three-week period of potential latency. The options
ranged from home self-monitoring, with or without some ability to leave the
home under limited circumstances, to confinement in a medical institution or

33
While not the drastic step of a geographic quarantine, there are other modern examples of local
protectionism as a bias in public health federalism. These include disputes over trash and toxic waste disposal
from out-of-state sources. As I describe elsewhere, these and other examples reflect the urge to defend one’s
state against outside threats. See Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism
Theater in the Era of the Shotgun Quarantine, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 425–27 (2016).
34
As discussed below, federal courts might void or ameliorate overly aggressive and harmful state
quarantines while they are in place, but they face numerous practical hurdles, meaning individuals would have
no effective remedy when reasonably needed.
35
See Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/vhf/ebola/index.html (last updated June 13, 2017).
36
See id. (describing symptoms and transmission).

PRICE GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

FEDERAL VERSUS STATE CONTROL OF QUARANTINE

3/30/2018 9:45 AM

505

other isolation facility. In Georgia, for example, some returning travelers could
be confined in a state facility for up to three weeks.37
In 2014, several state governors publicly denounced the CDC quarantine
protocol and screenings as inadequate, and imposed their own, more stringent
requirements.38 Led by New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, other governors
followed suit, criticizing the Obama Administration for allegedly failing to
protect the nation.39 The spectacle was political theater, but the state quarantine
policies caused harm beyond state borders, including the fact that international
airports in these states handled arrivals of people who lived and worked in
adjacent states.
These state governors—from both political parties—squabbled publicly
with the CDC and other federal government actors about who was in charge,
whether to close the borders, and who should be quarantined.40 Some political
analysts concluded that the governors feared political fallout should their state
fail to take an aggressive approach, after New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
had done so.41
In the states with tighter restrictions, CDC quarantine officers cooperated
fully with state public health officials, knowing that many of the quarantine
measures imposed by state political leaders were not necessary.42 The CDC
stated that while its guidance “established a baseline standard, states had the
authority to apply restrictions that exceeded CDC’s recommendations.”43 That
37
See Greg Bluestein, Nathan Deal Backs More Aggressive Ebola Quarantine Policy, ATLANTA J.
CONST.: POLITICALLY GA. (Oct. 27, 2014), http://politics.myajc.com/blog/politics/nathan-deal-backs-moreaggressive-ebola-quarantine-policy/8svkLxeZ4zGY8aUsqc5uDK/.
38
An editorial in The New England Journal of Medicine criticized these governors’ actions as harmful
and unnecessary, stating, “We should be guided by the science and not the tremendous fear that this virus
evokes.” Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2030 (Nov. 20, 2014).
39
See Laura Stampler, Chris Christie Defends Controversial Ebola Quarantine, TIME HEALTH (Oct.
28, 2014), http://time.com/3543163/christie-ebola-quarantine-kaci-hickox/; see also Matt Katz, Governors
Defend Decisions on Ebola Quarantines, NPR (Oct. 26, 2014, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/10/26/
359120784/governors-defend-decisions-on-ebola-quarantines.
40
Jess Bidgood & Kate Xernike, From Governors, a Mix of Hard-Line Acts and Conciliation Over
Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/us/kaci-hickox-nurse-under-ebolaquarantine-takes-bike-ride-defying-maine-officials.html?_r=0.
41
Id. Announcing new restrictions soon after Governor Christie had done so in New Jersey, Georgia
Governor Nathan Deal stated: “We intend to be as protective of Georgia citizens as possible . . . . I would
remind you, however, it’s better to be overly cautious than not cautious at all.” Bluestein, supra note 37.
42
Cf. Denver Nicks, The CDC Has Less Power than You Think, and Likes It that Way, TIME (Oct. 27,
2014), http://time.com/3516827/cdc-constitution-quarantine.
43
Notes on the Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola
Virus Exposure, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/
monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
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stance, politically, was the path of least resistance. The CDC needed to retain
good working relationships with the governors and health departments of those
states. Those governors are also each represented in Congress by two U.S.
Senators. The CDC is dependent on funding via annual appropriations by
Congress,44 so it has strong incentives not to rock the boat at the state level.
Lawsuits brought by individuals would be insufficient to remedy the worst
effects of an overly aggressive state quarantine while it is in place. An
indication of how the judicial system might view excessive state quarantine
policies can be gleaned from two recent lawsuits stemming from the 2014
Ebola outbreak. Litigation in New Jersey and Connecticut disputed the
necessity for the kind of strict quarantine imposed by those states’ health
departments with respect to returning health workers and others who
potentially had been exposed to the virus but who exhibited no symptoms.45
Medical groups argued that automatic three-week quarantines discouraged
health-care workers from traveling to Ebola-stricken countries, while New
Jersey and other states contended that such restrictions were necessary to
protect public health.46
Litigation in New Jersey pitted Governor Chris Christie against Kaci
Hickox, whose highly publicized experience in quarantine in both New Jersey
and Maine can provide a postmortem on state Ebola quarantines.47 Hickox

44
See Leah S. Fischer et al., How Is CDC Funded to Respond to Public Health Emergencies? Federal
Appropriations and Budget Execution Process for Non-Financial Experts, 15 HEALTH SECURITY 307 (2017).
45
Polly J. Price, Quarantines and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 500
(2016).
46
Id.
47
Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016). When Hickox returned to the United States
from Sierra Leone in 2014, where she had worked at an Ebola treatment unit, her immediate quarantine at
Newark International Airport became widely publicized. Id. at 585–87. By order of the New Jersey
Department of Health, Hickox spent nearly four days in isolation, initially at Newark International Airport. Id.
at 584. By agreement between the New Jersey and Maine health departments, Hickox moved to her residence
in Maine, where she remained under a quarantine order for three weeks. Hickox exhibited no symptoms
throughout her isolation and never developed Ebola. Id. at 586–87.
In technical parlance, Hickox was placed in quarantine, not isolation, given that she did not exhibit
symptoms of Ebola, and indeed never contracted the disease. A state judge ruled that public health officials
had not proved “by clear and convincing evidence that limiting Respondent’s movements to the degree
requested” was needed to protect the public and thus modified the quarantine order. Mayhew v. Hickox, No.
CV-2014-36, slip op. at 1 (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 31, 2014) (order pending hearing). The modification
eased the most stringent aspect of the order—home seclusion for three weeks—while retaining monitoring and
social-distancing aspects of the quarantine order consistent with recommendations by the CDC. Jess Bidgood
& Dave Phillips, Judge in Maine Eases Restrictions on Nurse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/11/01/us/ebola-maine-nurse-kaci-hickox.html?_r=0; Maine Ebola Nurse Kaci Hickox, Free
of Monitoring, Says We Must “Get Over This Fear,” NBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014, 10:45 AM), https://www.
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sued Governor Christie and New Jersey public health officials for
compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000, alleging there
was no legal or medical basis for the quarantine order in her case.48 Hickox
claimed there was no adequate individualized assessment of any risk she might
have posed to the public.49 She also claimed that the duration and terms of the
confinement lacked justification, all of which violated her civil rights.50
Hickox later settled the lawsuit in favor of reform of New Jersey’s
quarantine practice.51 The settlement created a so-called quarantine “Bill of
Rights” including procedural protections and a heightened standard of medical
necessity.52 Notably, the settlement did not include any monetary damages or
attorney’s fees, likely because official immunity would have been difficult to
overcome had the case proceeded in court.53
Another challenge to state quarantine practices during the Ebola outbreak
arose in Connecticut. Yale University’s Legal Services Organization filed a
class action lawsuit against the Governor and state public health officials over
the state’s treatment of residents affected by Connecticut’s Ebola quarantine
policies.54 The complaint sought damages on behalf of Connecticut residents
who were quarantined for up to three weeks with police officers posted outside

nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/maine-ebola-nurse-kaci-hickox-free-monitoring-says-we-mustn246131.
48
Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d. at 592, 597–98. Hickox was placed into quarantine at the New Jersey airport
upon her arrival on October 24, 2014, and was later transported to a hospital isolation unit. Id. at 585–86. The
following day, the New Jersey Department of Health issued an administrative order declaring quarantine and
isolation of Hickox. Id. at 586–87. Hickox also included a defamation claim specifically against Governor
Christie. Id. at 605.
49
Id. at 597.
50
See Robert Gatter, Quarantine Controversy: Kaci Hickox v. Governor Chris Christie, 46 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 7, 7 (2016).
51
See Charles Toutant, Remuneration Rare in Quarantine Suits, Ebola Nurse Settlement Shows, N.J.
L.J. (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202794613880/Remuneration-Rare-in-QuarantineSuits-Ebola-Nurse-Settlement-Shows; Mark Santora, New Jersey Accepts Rights for People in Quarantine to
End Ebola Suit, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/new-jerseyaccepts-rights-for-people-in-quarantine-to-end-ebola-suit.html.
52
See Kaci Hickox’s Settlement with Christie Administration Creates Quarantine “Bill of Rights,” AM.
C. L. UNION N.J. (July 27, 2017), https://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2017/07/27/victory-detained-nurses-ebolasuit-secures-due-process.
53
See Toutant, supra note 51.
54
Sheri Fink, Connecticut Faces Lawsuit over Ebola Quarantine Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/08/nyregion/connecticut-faces-lawsuit-over-ebola-quarantine-policies.html.
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their residences.55 This lawsuit was dismissed on the grounds of governmental
immunity and lack of standing.56
With the exception of the litigation in Maine, which demonstrated that
courts are willing to modify the conditions of a quarantine, the New Jersey and
Connecticut litigation teach that individual lawsuits seeking damages after the
fact may not provide a sufficient deterrent to prevent this kind of harm. For one
thing, it takes time for any lawsuit to wind through the court system. And these
were only two lawsuits; large-scale quarantines could overwhelm the court
system.
The threat of paying damages after the fact is unlikely to deter
overreaching quarantine policy for two additional reasons. First is the
likelihood of official immunity, an important legal protection for public health
officials. State public health emergency statutes typically provide immunity
explicitly.57 And even where there is no specific provision for immunity,
government employees are protected from liability for reasonable actions taken
in a good-faith belief of public necessity. Qualified immunity, when
applicable, shields government officials from liability while performing
discretionary functions when their actions did not violate “clearly established
law,” even if later found to be unlawful.58 A right is not clearly established
unless its contours are “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”59
This doctrine of qualified immunity protects public health workers who act
in good faith and in a reasonable manner. As evident from the order dismissing
the litigation over Connecticut’s Ebola quarantine policy, precedent and policy
lean heavily in favor of public health workers unless they violate settled
constitutional standards or clear statutory directives. Immunity from liability is
particularly relevant in the area of quarantine because courts have yet to
establish clear constitutional mandates.

55
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & YALE GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP, FEAR, POLITICS, AND EBOLA:
HOW QUARANTINES HURT THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA AND VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION 18 (2015).
56
See Associated Press, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Malloy, State over Ebola Quarantines,
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 3, 2017, 3:52 PM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-malloy-ebolaquarantine-20170403-story.html.
57
See, for example, Georgia’s public health emergency legislation, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 et seq.
(West Supp. 2017). In addition, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act also provides immunity for
public health officials. See The Center for Law & The Public’s Health, supra note 31; see also Responsibilities
in a Public Health Emergency, supra note 31.
58
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
59
Id. at 741 (internal quotations marks omitted).
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The second reason is that even if a plaintiff were to prevail, monetary
damages are likely to be minimal. Individuals subject to quarantine or isolation
are not entitled to payment for lost wages.60 Back pay is not the state’s
responsibility. Kacie Hickox, for example, settled her lawsuit in return for
change to New Jersey’s quarantine rules, but she received no monetary award
or attorney’s fees.61 She likely settled the suit in recognition of the substantial
hurdles of government immunity and difficult-to-quantify damages in light of
the state’s lack of obligation to pay for the time she was prevented from
working. The settlement did, however, change quarantine practice going
forward—at least in New Jersey—a more-than-symbolic victory recognizing
that Hickox and other returning health workers had been treated wrongly.
Thus, from a civil liability standpoint, there is little incentive not to impose
quarantines more stringent than necessary, whether of individuals, groups, or
exclusionary zones. This is not to question the ethics and responsibilities of
state public health employees, but political control is often held by elected
politicians who are not subject to these professional constraints.
While there is reason to believe that some states imposed strict quarantines
not out of medical advisability but as a reaction to the clamor of their
electorate, local governments also fall prey to this tendency to overreact. In
one example, the City of Milford, Connecticut, imposed a twenty-one-day ban
on an elementary school student following a family trip to Nigeria.62 At the
time, Nigeria had no cases of Ebola. The City later settled a lawsuit brought by
the child’s father for $30,000.63
Other negative incentives may include the perception that other state and
local health departments are unable to contain epidemics within their
jurisdictions, with unwanted spillover effects for their neighbors. This is one
manifestation of a weak system of public health in the United States, due to its
fragmented nature and reliance on political will to support health departments
through local taxes.64

60

See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 26, at 244.
See Toutant, supra note 51.
62
Associated Press, Milford Paid $30K to Settle Ebola Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT (June 13, 2015,
3:15 PM), http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-milford-ebola-lawsuit-settlement-20150613-story.html.
63
Id.
64
As I wrote recently, “Our system of federalism and a fragmented public health infrastructure mean
that the cost of health control measures falls on state and local governments, with uneven effectiveness and
greatly disproportionate impact in some communities. The problem is thus systemic: the fragmented structure
of public health agencies in the United States can prevent an effective response to even wholly local
epidemics.” Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 919.
61
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Of course at the federal level as well, government policy may be driven by
fear, not science. Before he was elected president, for example, Donald Trump
stated during the Ebola outbreak that U.S. “health [care] workers who got sick
while treating victims should be prevented from returning to the United States
for medical care.”65 This stance was contrary to medical and scientific
consensus, raising concerns about how Mr. Trump might direct federal
quarantine policy were he to be elected president. The desire is to avoid
unnecessary and harmful government overreaction at any level of government
where that might occur. The federal government is not better at quarantine
policy than states simply because it is the federal government (although it
directs the superior resources of the CDC). The question instead is whether
uniform national policy might in some instances be preferable to a patchwork
of state quarantines.
To return to my point, we should explore the question whether the federal
government may override or veto excessively restrictive state quarantines that
harm both national interests and the interests of neighboring states. When
might an enforceable, uniform national standard be preferable? When might it
not be permissible for states to “apply restrictions that exceeded CDC’s
recommendations”?66 As explained in the following sections, the federal
government has this authority but has not exercised it in the modern era
because it has not been needed. The United States has not yet experienced an
epidemic on the scale of SARS in several Asian countries,67 Swine Flu (H1N1)
in Mexico,68 or Ebola in West Africa.
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE: WHAT IS “INTERSTATE” QUARANTINE POWER?
To understand the concept of “interstate” quarantine in federal law, we
must distinguish it from its better-known counterpart, federal health inspection
and quarantine authority at U.S. border points of entry. Health inspection at the
border is an uncontroversial proposition, at least in the context of federal
control over entry into the country. The authority of the U.S. government to
impose health inspections on immigrants, interdict arriving travelers, for
65

Stein, supra note 1.
Notes on the Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola
Virus Exposure, supra note 43.
67
The WHO reported more than 8,000 people worldwide were infected with SARS, and among these,
774 died, during the 2003 outbreak. SARS Basics Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/fs-sars.html (last updated July 2, 2012).
68
Outbreak of Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infection — Mexico, March–April 2009, 58
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 467, 468 (2009) (noting nearly 2,000 reported cases, including cases in
each of Mexico’s states and Federal District).
66
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example, is long-standing in our history.69 Non-citizens having one of a list of
diseases may not be issued travel visas nor can they enter the country, while
returning American citizens are subject to temporary quarantine for these same
diseases.70 The federal government, not the states, is the primary guardian of
the nation’s borders, and this is true for public health defense as well.
Congress, in fact, permits the executive branch to suspend entry from entire
countries, if epidemic conditions in those countries are believed to pose a
public health threat to the United States.71 Some politicians called for the
Obama Administration to invoke this authority against some nations in West
Africa during the 2014 Ebola outbreak.72
This Article does not address the ways in which border health defense
might be improved. It takes for granted that the border is unavoidably porous
to contagious disease. Birds and mosquitoes, for example, are notoriously
disrespectful of political boundaries and are responsible for many lethal
viruses.73 Nor do I consider whether the present allocation of quarantine
stations and the number of U.S. public health service personnel assigned to
them are optimal.
The federal government’s quarantine authority is not only international (“to
prevent the introduction . . . of communicable diseases from foreign countries
into the [United] States”), but also an independent authority for preventing the
spread of communicable diseases within the United States.74 Federal

69
See ALAN M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GENES, GERMS, AND THE “IMMIGRANT MENACE” (1994)
(exploring history of immigrant health inspections in the United States).
70
See generally Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 926–28 (citing immigration laws). For the current
list of quarantinable communicable diseases, see Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note
15.
71
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 265 provides: “Whenever the Surgeon General determines that by reason of
the existence of any communicable disease in a foreign country there is serious danger of the introduction of
such disease into the United States, and that this danger is so increased by the introduction of persons or
property from such country that a suspension of the right to introduce such persons and property is required in
the interest of the public health, the Surgeon General, in accordance with regulations approved by the
President, shall have the power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from
such countries or places as he shall designate in order to avert such danger, and for such period of time as he
may deem necessary for such purpose.” 42 U.S.C. § 265 (2012).
72
See, e.g., Igor Bobic, Scott Brown Wants to Secure the Border Because of Ebola, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 9, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/09/scott-brown-ebola_n_5959200.html;
Steven Nelson, Congressman: Close Border to Ebola Countries, U.S. NEWS (July 30, 2014, 11:52 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/30/congressman-close-border-to-ebola-countries (identifying
Representative Alan Grayson, a Democrat from Florida).
73
Mosquito-Borne Diseases, AM. MOSQUITO CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.mosquito.org/page/diseases
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
74
42 U.S.C. § 264.

PRICE GALLEYPROOFS2

512

3/30/2018 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:491

quarantine authority exists for the interior, but it is rarely used. As a practical
matter, within the United States this power is relevant only to air travel.75
The common view is that the federal government may interfere with a
state’s or municipality’s choice to impose quarantine restrictions only when a
state asks for assistance, or when it fails to take effective measures to prevent
an epidemic crossing state lines.76 In the hypothetical scenarios discussed
above, the states have not failed to act, nor have they requested assistance.77
These scenarios instead draw attention to the opposite problem: a state or local
government engages in protectionism (economic or political) beyond medical
justification, disrupting commerce and the movement of persons to the
detriment of neighboring states as well as to the national interest.
This concept of interstate quarantine as a power of the federal government
has been in the U.S. Code since 1890, in substantially the same language as the
current statutory version.78 We would do well to explore the concept as an
outer boundary of federal authority, but we also should consider what,
practically, the federal government might do to help prevent the spread of
epidemic disease in the United States through the use of its quarantine
authority.
The topic has received little scholarly attention. A 2003 report
commissioned by the CDC raises but does not resolve the issue of whether a
state might impose a travel ban, or any type of quarantine with adverse effects
on state or local governments outside its borders.79 As the report notes,
The authority of the United States government to control foreign and
interstate travel is established by the Constitution and federal statute.
It is less clear, however, the circumstances under which states may
restrict interstate travel to prevent the spread of infection, and this

75
As detailed below in Part IV, at the request of a state public health officer the CDC can place a
tuberculosis patient on a federal Do Not Board list, which prevents an individual on the list from boarding both
domestic and international flights. See Public Health Interventions Involving Travelers with Tuberculosis —
U.S. Ports of Entry, 2007–2012, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 570, 571 (2012).
76
Recent scholarship emphasizes the inability of states, acting alone, to effectively respond to a major
epidemic without federal assistance and coordination. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11:
Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201 (2002) (exploring the Commerce Clause
and police power of states); John Thomas Clarkson, Note, Phase Six Pandemic: A Call to Re-Evaluate Federal
Quarantine Authority Before the Next Catastrophic Outbreak, 44 GA. L. REV. 803 (2010) (describing the
ability of the federal government to respond to a public health emergency).
77
See supra Section II.B.
78
Part IV reviews the historical evolution of the federal quarantine statute.
79
See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS: A
REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2003).
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issue should be thoroughly researched and resolved through
memoranda of understanding or other means.80

This issue has yet to be thoroughly researched and it certainly has not been
resolved. Recently, however, Professor Eang Ngov published an important
article exploring preemption of state Ebola quarantine regulations.81 Ngov’s
preemption argument hinges on the federal government’s border quarantine
authority, rather than interstate, because it focuses on national re-entry of
medical workers during the Ebola crisis.82 Ngov argues that excessively
restrictive state quarantines ultimately harm a greater federal purpose: it
discourages medical professionals from volunteering their services abroad,
harming the national interest in global health security.83
My analysis, by contrast, does not rely on plenary authority at the borders
for the “dominant federal purpose” of a preemption analysis.84 Instead, this
Article identifies a dominant federal purpose in the longstanding, independent
interstate authority provided by Congress. We need not rely on national
security or global threats for preemption analysis because there is a purely
domestic federal interest drawn from direct statutory authorization. For that
reason, this Article explores preemption of state quarantine orders from a
different vantage point—one that benefits from the historical analysis provided
in Part III.
In addition, this analysis is not limited to the recent context of the 2014
Ebola outbreak. That episode was experienced primarily as a threat from
abroad. Instead, this Article examines the issue from an imagined future
epidemic wholly internal to the United States. While such an epidemic may in
some sense have originated from abroad, the major problems the United States
would face would no longer be about what to do at the border. The inquiry
here is both different from and broader than Ngov’s analysis.
My argument instead is that the federal government’s authority to intervene
in the event of spread of epidemic disease within the United States has been
viewed in an unnecessarily restrictive way. The federal government need not
wait to act until requested by a State, or until a state fails to act. It possesses
statutory authority to act independently if circumstances demand. The
80

Id. at 8.
Ngov, supra note 3, at 6.
82
Id. at 5–6.
83
Id. at 8.
84
See id. (“The dominant federal purposes are national security and control over foreign affairs, which
would be affected by the spread of Ebola in the United States and abroad.”).
81
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remaining parts of this Article examine this claim, beginning with the statutory
basis for federal quarantine authority.
A. The Traditional Understanding of Federal Versus State Quarantine Power
The sections below provide an overview of the interstate quarantine
authority held by the federal government, beginning with its current statutory
basis through the CDC’s 2017 quarantine regulations. Since 2000, the federal
government’s quarantine authority has been delegated to the CDC.85
It is helpful to begin with a broad overview of current practice. First, what
do we usually mean when discussing federal versus state quarantine power? As
understood today, the federal government’s modern actions in the area of
public health are based primarily upon the Commerce Clause,86 the tax clause
(spending to “provide for the common Defence and General Welfare of the
United States”),87 and the federal government’s responsibility to protect the
nation from external threats.88 State and local governments are responsible for
population-based health services, including surveillance and treatment of
contagious diseases.89
The federal government has both constitutional and statutory authority to
independently administer interstate and foreign quarantine. It may also “assist
with or take over the management of an intrastate incident if requested by a
state or if the federal government determines local efforts are inadequate.”90
The unique brand of federalism in the United States divides quarantine
authority between states and the federal government.91 If a communicable
disease is suspected or identified in a person arriving at the U.S. border or port
85
JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION AUTHORITY 2 (2014). Matters of interstate and foreign quarantine are delegated to the CDC’s
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine. Id.
86
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”).
87
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . .”). This authority is the modern basis for federal grants to state and local health departments to
encourage compliance with public health standards.
88
Several provisions of the U.S. Constitution together provide the authority to “provide for the common
defense,” a phrase contained in the Constitution’s preamble. These include separate powers listed in Section
Eight of the Article I of the Constitution. See Jim Talent, A Constitutional Basis for Defense, HERITAGE
FOUND. (June 1, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/constitutional-basis-defense.
89
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 47 (2000).
90
COLE, supra note 85, at 1.
91
See generally Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 922.
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of entry, the CDC may issue a federal isolation or quarantine order.92 Federal
regulations also allow the CDC to take measures to limit the spread of
communicable diseases from one state into another, including anytime the
CDC Director determines that the actions taken by the health authorities of a
state are insufficient to prevent the spread of communicable disease.93 The
communicable diseases subject to quarantine are listed in an executive order of
the President.94
In the United States, immigration and border control officers may refuse to
admit any non-U.S. citizen infected with a “communicable disease of public
health significance.”95 U.S. citizens, on the other hand, cannot be refused reentry into the country, although officials can order immediate isolation at their
arrival point, and can prohibit air travel for the period during which a sick
patient could spread the disease.96
To summarize, the federal government:
•
•
•
•

Acts to prevent the entry of communicable diseases into the United
States.
Is authorized to take measures to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases between states.
May assist state and local authorities in preventing the spread of
communicable diseases.
Maintains a Do Not Board list preventing air travel for patients with
any infectious disease that is a potential public health threat to
passengers, including infectious TB. Persons are added to the Do Not
Board list only with reliable medical information provided by a state

92
See Quarantine and Isolation: U.S. Quarantine Stations, supra note 11. U.S. CBP and U.S. Coast
Guard officers are authorized to help enforce federal quarantine orders. See Control of Communicable
Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890, 6916 (Jan. 19, 2017) (“[L]aw enforcement support for quarantine or isolation
orders will generally be provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, or other Federal
law enforcement programs . . . .”).
93
42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2016).
94
See Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. § 220 (2003), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, 3 C.F.R.
§ 162 (2005), and Exec. Order No. 13,674, 3 C.F.R. § 291 (2014).
95
See Legal Authorities for Medical Examination of Aliens, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/laws-regulations.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2016).
96
See Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 923. See generally QUARANTINE STATIONS AT PORTS OF
ENTRY: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 1–8, 36–42 (Laura B. Sivitz et al. eds., 2006).
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public health official and following a reviewed approval process by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.97
State, local, and tribal public health authorities:
•
•

Initiate isolation and quarantine within their borders, relying on local
law enforcement officers to enforce public health orders.98
Assume primary responsibility for treatment and for tracing contacts
of persons with infectious diseases such as TB.99

The nation’s primary public health authority is divided among 2,684 state,
local, and tribal health departments.100 These health departments are
responsible for the prevention and control of communicable disease. Among
other tasks, state and local health departments investigate contagious disease
outbreaks, coordinate control efforts, and provide public information.
Jurisdictional boundaries are guarded, among other reasons, to preserve limited
budgets.101
B. Legislative Authority for Interstate Quarantine
The ability to impose interstate quarantine is established by Congress, and
is found in the Public Health Service Act. The relevant section authorizes the
apprehension and examination of
[A]ny individual reasonably believed to be infected with a
communicable disease in a qualifying stage and (A) To be moving or
about to move from a State to another State; or (B) To be a probable
source of infection to individuals who, while infected with such
disease in a qualifying stage, will be moving from a State to another
State.102

97
Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 14; see also Questions and
Answers About the Federal Register Notice, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/quarantine/qas-frn-travel-restriction.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2015).
98
See generally State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, supra note 15 (listing state laws and
describing range of authority).
99
CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S HEALTH, TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL LAWS AND POLICIES: A HANDBOOK
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND LEGAL PRACTITIONERS 21–22 (2009).
100
See CAROLYN J. LEEP, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTY. & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, THE LOCAL HEALTH
DEPARTMENT WORKFORCE: FINDINGS FROM THE 2005 NATIONAL PROFILE OF LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS
STUDY 1 (2007).
101
Price, Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 947–48, 950–51.
102
42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1) (2012).
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Federal quarantine and isolation orders are self-executing, meaning that federal
authorities need not apply to a court in advance.103
The statutory provision for “Regulations to control communicable
diseases” further empowers the Surgeon General to make and enforce
regulations to prevent introduction of communicable diseases from foreign
countries, as well as measures to prevent spread of disease within the United
States.104 The general authority over interstate quarantine appears in subsection
(a).105 The key language is the Surgeon General’s authority to “prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases . . . from one
State or possession into any other State or possession.”106
Following this general authority, subsection (d) provides for “apprehension
and examination of persons reasonably believed to be infected”:
Regulations prescribed under this section may provide for the
apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed
to be infected with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage and
(A) to be moving or about to move from a State to another State; or
(B) to be a probable source of infection to individuals who, while
infected with such disease in a qualifying stage, will be moving from
a State to another State. Such regulations may provide that if upon
examination any such individual is found to be infected, he may be
detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably
necessary.107

Again, the key language is “from one State or possession into any other State
or possession,” unchanged since the Public Health Service Act of 1944.108 The
penalty prescribed by Congress for any individual who violates a quarantine
103
See Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890, 6899–6900 (Jan. 19, 2017) (explaining
exception to general warrant requirement).
104
42 U.S.C. § 264.
105
See id. § 264(a) (“The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to make and
enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread
of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession.” (emphasis added)).
106
Id.
107
Id. § 264(d).
108
As the annotation to 42 U.S.C. § 264 notes, there were several administrative permutations, including
the substitution of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The annotation provides: “Transfer of
Functions”: “Functions of Federal Security Administrator transferred to Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare and all agencies of Federal Security Agency transferred to Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare by section 5 of Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1953, set out as a note under section 3501 of this title. Federal
Security Agency and office of Administrator abolished by section 8 of Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1953. Secretary
and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare redesignated Secretary and Department of Health and
Human Services by section 509(b) of Pub. L. 96–88 which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title 20.” Id.
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order or regulation is a “fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both.”109
42 U.S.C. § 264 also contains a subsection concerning preemption:
Nothing in this section or section 266 of this title, or the regulations
promulgated under such sections, may be construed as superseding
any provision under State law (including regulations and including
provisions established by political subdivisions of States), except to
the extent that such a provision conflicts with an exercise of Federal
authority under this section or section 266 of this title.110

This preemption clause was added in 2002 as part of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, legislation passed
by Congress in the wake of anthrax attacks and in the shadow of September
11.111 The legislation was designed generally to provide more effective
response to acts of bioterrorism as well as other public health emergencies.
Substantively, the 2002 Bioterrorism Act enhanced the federal
government’s quarantine authority in case of exposure to disease by
substituting “in a communicable stage” with “in a qualifying stage.”112 Under
this new language, persons potentially exposed to a disease, but not yet (or
perhaps ever) showing symptoms, may be subject to a federal quarantine
order.113 This expansion from “communicable stage” to “qualifying stage”
would become important in the Ebola outbreak of 2014.
The legislative history of the preemption clause, however, is unclear. The
clause appears in a section of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act titled “Streamlining
and Clarifying Communicable Disease Quarantine Provisions.”114 This section
prohibited the National Advisory Health Council, a holdover from the original
1944 Public Health Service Act, from any role in determining specific diseases
subject to individual detentions, instead giving authority that to the President,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and in consultation with the Surgeon General. The section also removed the

109

Id. § 271(a).
Id. § 264(e). The reference to 42 U.S.C. § 266 is to “Special Quarantine Powers in Time of War,”
enacted in 1944 when national emergencies were proclaimed by President Roosevelt during World War II. Id.
§ 266.
111
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107188, 116 Stat. 594 (June 12, 2002).
112
Id. at 116 Stat. 627, § 142 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)).
113
Id.
114
Id.
110
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Council from any role in promulgating regulations providing for apprehension
of individuals for quarantine or isolation.115
The legislative history of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act does not reveal where
this preemption clause originated or any particular information about why it
was included. Although there is no specific legislative history, the introduction
of the preemption section was likely a political trade-off for what some
perceived to be potential impingement of state authority resulting from other
provisions in the 2002 Bioterrorism Act.
In any event, the preemption clause by its terms has no relevance for
federal nullification of a state-imposed cordon sanitaire or other type of
quarantine. Preemption is permissible, if not mandated, anytime “such a [state]
provision conflicts with an exercise of Federal authority under this section.”116
So, a federal quarantine imposed to “prevent the introduction, transmission, or
spread of communicable diseases . . . from one State or possession into any
other State or possession”117 is an “exercise of Federal authority under this
section.” To the extent preemption analysis is relevant to my argument, then, it
does not come from the preemption clause in the quarantine statute itself.
I will return to the current statutory authority for interstate quarantine to
explore its historical antecedents. These antecedents illuminate how the limits
to interstate quarantine authority were originally viewed as a matter of
constitutional law and congressional intent. First, however, we should consider
the relevant implementing regulations—the new federal quarantine regulations
discussed at this Symposium.
C. 2017 Federal Quarantine Regulations, “Interstate and Foreign”
The new regulations related to interstate quarantine are found in a rule
published January 19, 2017, titled “Control of Communicable Diseases:
Interstate and Foreign,” which became effective on March 21, 2017.118 The
2017 Regulations were promulgated pursuant to title 42 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, in two parts. Part 70 applies to interstate quarantine, while Part 71
applies to foreign arrivals.119 The new rule encapsulates quarantine both

115

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2012).
117
Id. § 264(a); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text.
118
Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890, 6890 (Jan. 19, 2017). The final rule amends
42 C.F.R. pts. 70 and 71. Id.
119
See 42 C.F.R. pts. 70–71.
116
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“Interstate and Foreign.”120 Procedures for both are now combined in the new
regulations.
As stated by the CDC, “This final rule improves CDC’s ability to protect
against the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases
while ensuring due process.”121 According to CDC, the substance of the new
rule does not change longstanding CDC procedures: “This Final Rule enhances
HHS/CDC’s ability to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of
communicable diseases into the United States and interstate by clarifying and
providing greater transparency regarding its response capabilities and
practices.”122 The rule, in other words, does not expand the CDC’s
jurisdictional authority, whether interstate or at the border, with respect to
quarantine.123
Some prior history of the 2017 quarantine regulations is instructive. The
CDC first proposed an update to federal quarantine regulations in 2005.124
Those proposed regulations were formally withdrawn and replaced with the
rules that became final in 2017.125 Prompted by the potential spread of avian
flu (which, unlike Ebola, can be spread through the air),126 in 2005 the CDC
proposed regulations that would have granted the federal government a power
of “provisional quarantine” to confine airline passengers involuntarily for up to
three days if they exhibit symptoms of certain infectious diseases.127 Federal
officials would also have been able to quarantine passengers exposed to people
with those symptoms.

120

Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. at 6890.
Final Rule for Control of Communicable Diseases: Interstate and Foreign, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/final-rule-communicable-diseases.html (last
updated Mar. 21, 2017).
122
Specific Laws and Regulations Governing the Control of Communicable Diseases, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/specificlawsregulations.html (last updated
Mar. 21, 2017).
123
Questions and Answers About the Final Rule for Control of Communicable Diseases: Interstate
(Domestic) and Foreign Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
quarantine/qa-final-rule-communicable-diseases.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2017).
124
See Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Proposes Modernizing Control of
Communicable Disease Regulations, https://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r051122.htm (last updated Nov. 22,
2005). The 2017 rules modified the 2005 proposal by making due process protections more explicit and by
requiring a narrower range of information to be collected by airlines.
125
See Control of Communicable Diseases, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,230, 54,234 (proposed Aug. 15, 2016) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70–71).
126
Prevention and Treatment of Avian Influenza A Viruses in People, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/prevention.htm (last updated Apr. 17, 2017).
127
Alison Young, Obama Administration Scraps Quarantine Regulations, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2010,
8:53 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-01-quarantine_N.htm.
121
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The proposed rules would have expanded obligations of airlines to inform
the CDC about sick passengers and to maintain contact information about all
fliers in case the CDC and other federal agencies need to investigate a serious
disease outbreak. Opposed by the airline industry and civil liberties groups, the
regulations were withdrawn in 2010.128
Carried over from the 2005 proposed rules, however, are “provisions
governing the content of written . . . orders for quarantine, isolation, and
conditional release, . . . procedures for administrative hearings to review these
written Federal orders, and a specific provision governing the content and
compiling of an administrative record.”129
While the 2005 proposed regulations were pending, in 2008 Congress
asked HHS to take another look at federal quarantine and isolation practices,
specifically in the context of TB control.130 The request for a review of
quarantine regulations followed a TB scare in 2007, when the public learned
that a person later determined to be suffering from drug-resistant TB had
boarded multiple flights.131 The resulting legislation, the Comprehensive
Tuberculosis Elimination Act of 2008, directed HHS to update federal
quarantine regulations: “Not later than 240 days after the date of enactment of
this Act [Oct. 13, 2008], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
promulgate regulations to update the current interstate and foreign quarantine
regulations found in parts 70 and 71 of title 42, Code of Federal
Regulations.”132
Hardly noticed, and relatively inconsequential, two final rules were
published in December 2012 amending the Interstate and Foreign Quarantine
Regulations.133 “The updates reorganize[d] the Scope and Definitions [sections
of the regulations] to reflect modern terminology and plain language used in
practice by industry and public health partners.”134 According to the CDC,

128

Id.
Control of Communicable Diseases, 81 Fed. Reg. at 54,234.
130
Comprehensive Tuberculosis Elimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-392, § 121(c), 122 Stat. 4200
(Oct. 13, 2008).
131
Vikki Valentine, A Timeline of Andrew Speaker’s Infection, NPR (June 6, 2007), http://www.npr.org/
news/specials/tb/.
132
Comprehensive Tuberculosis Elimination Act of 2008 § 121(c).
133
Final Rules for Control of Communicable Diseases: Interstate and Foreign—Scope and Definitions,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/final-rules-controlcommunicable-diseases.html (last updated Mar. 10, 2014).
134
Id.
129
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these 2012 updates were “the first step in helping modernize the federal
quarantine regulations.”135
Thus, the new 2017 regulations culminate a multi-year effort to update
quarantine regulations to better reflect how federal quarantine and isolation
authority has been exercised in practice, and to detail the due process
protections accorded to individuals who may be affected.
D. Objections to the Rule: Asking the Wrong Question?
Some aspects of the new quarantine regulations immediately drew
criticism. In an opinion piece published in the New York Times, titled “Why the
C.D.C.’s Power to Quarantine Should Worry Us,” the authors objected to
internal review procedures as insufficient protection for due process rights,
though without suggesting a viable alternative for independent medical review
outside of the agency before a quarantine decision is made.136 Nor do the
authors suggest which medical professionals outside of the agency should
review the continuing justification for an existing quarantine order. Instead, the
authors claim there would be little or no internal agency review before a
quarantined individual could petition a federal court for review of the
quarantine order.137 These objections on civil liberties/due process grounds
apply equally to interstate as well as border quarantine authority, without
distinguishing the two.
It may be that the authors’ primary concern is with who wields that
authority within the executive branch. The editorial contends that, with the new
rules, “the administration of Donald J. Trump has even more authority to
detain people.”138 Oddly, the authors cite the case of Kaci Hickox as an
example of why we should fear the new federal regulations, even though, as
they acknowledge, their objection was to the actions of state governors, in this
case Governor Chris Christie, not the federal government.139 The writers in fact
highlighted why state power to quarantine should also worry us.140 The
concern over federal quarantine authority seemed squarely directed at the

135

Id.
Kyle Edwards et al., Opinion, Why the C.D.C.’s Power to Quarantine Should Worry Us, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/opinion/why-the-cdcs-power-to-quarantine-shouldworry-us.html?_r=0.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
136
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Trump Administration, understandable given candidate Trump’s comments
about closing the border during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.141
As Professor Wendy Parmet noted, “The concern . . . is that unless these
regulations are carried out with care, and by people who [base their actions] on
science, they can be used to trammel the civil liberties of Americans.”142 These
apprehensions apply equally to state quarantine policies.
Parmet is especially concerned that the CDC’s enhanced powers would
take effect just as the Trump Administration is assuming control over the
agency. As Parmet explained, “A lot of the signals we’ve received from
President Trump suggests he may be inclined to not always listen to the
science . . . and to ground policy in what I guess we’re now calling ‘alternative
facts,’ instead of scientific facts. That’s scary.”143
Another scholar, Scott Burris, expressed similar concerns: “My worst fear
is we have a replay of Ebola and we have, say, President Trump assert the
policy he thought we ought to have when he was citizen Trump.”144
The desire, quite rightly, is to avoid government overreaction, at any level
of government where that might occur. Professor Lawrence Gostin, for
example, stated that “the last thing we want in the face of a public health crisis
is overreaction. . . . And I think having rules in place that are modern at least
will provide some buffer against the whims of an administration that may
overreact.”145
Some media portrayed the 2017 quarantine regulations as expanding the
federal government’s power within a state. For example, a report on National
Public Radio stated: “With the new rules, the CDC would be able to detain
people anywhere in the country, without getting approval from state and local
officials.”146

141
S.A. Miller, Donald Trump: Fight Ebola at the Border, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/4/donald-trump-fight-ebola-border (noting that Trump would “den[y]
. . . all travelers from West Africa entry into the United States”).
142
Stein, supra note 1 (alteration in original).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
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But as noted above, the regulations on their face do not purport to expand
federal quarantine jurisdiction as it is already exercised within the United
States. And the CDC explicitly disclaimed this aim as well.147
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the CDC must still rely on state and
local health authorities to notify it of persons for whom quarantine is believed
necessary or advisable.148 It has no police force to execute orders. Its limited
interstate power has been exercised only through leverage over airlines via Do
Not Board orders.149 Federal isolation orders are quite rare: only twelve
isolation orders were issued between 2005 and 2016, an average of about one
order per year.150 CDC’s interstate quarantine power reaches only the relatively
affluent who travel within the United States by air. And even then, CDC is
reliant on notification by state or local health authorities to know about the
person at all, since interstate quarantine orders originate with a request from a
state public health official.
While the federal government possesses substantial statutory authority to
exercise its quarantine powers within the United States, both historically and
today the federal government defers to states on matters of quarantine and
isolation. The CDC states:
In general, HHS defers to the state and local health authorities in the
primary use of their separate quarantine powers. Based on long
experience and collaborative working relationships with our state and
local partners, CDC anticipates the need to use this federal authority
to actually quarantine a person will occur only in rare situations, such
as events at ports of entry or other time-sensitive settings.151

With this recent regulatory history in mind, the next Part describes the
motivation of Congress in providing for federal interstate quarantine authority

147
See Final Rule for Control of Communicable Diseases: Interstate and Foreign, supra note 121
(noting that the rule “[d]oes not expand CDC’s authority beyond what is granted by Congress, nor does it alter
the list of diseases subject to federal isolation or quarantine, which is established by an Executive Order of the
President”).
148
See Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890, 6906 (Jan. 19, 2017) (“HHS/CDC
further notes that it typically conducts the public health risk assessment in coordination with the State or local
health department of jurisdiction before issuing a Federal public health order . . . . Furthermore, decisions
regarding the issuance of Federal public health orders or medical examination for a suspected quarantinable
communicable disease would typically be made in coordination with a State or local health department of
jurisdiction.”).
149
See infra Part IV.
150
Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. at 6963.
151
Questions and Answers on Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE &
CONTROL PREVENTION 1–2 (Jan. 20, 2004), https://www.cdc.gov/sars/quarantine/qa-isolation.pdf.
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in the interior. Congress authorized broad federal power at the behest of states
suffering the most from an epidemic the rest of the nation seemed willing to
ignore.
III. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGIN OF FEDERAL INTERSTATE
QUARANTINE POWER
Part I imagined a scenario in which one state declares quarantine against
another, prohibiting incoming or outgoing travel and transport of goods.
Although there is no recent example, a little more than a century ago state and
local governments throughout the southern United States faced just that during
frightening and deadly outbreaks of yellow fever.
This historical episode allows us to examine how and why the federal
government gained interstate quarantine authority in the first place. Debates in
Congress over control of state and local quarantine tested Commerce Clause
and federalism principles that held state lines to be the limiting point of action
for the federal government. The outcome of these debates, I suggest,
constituted in many respects a “constitutional moment”152—a turning point in
relations between states and the national government over responsibility for
quarantine and the control of epidemic disease. Congress fully expected the
federal government to assume some control when the nation was faced with a
fast-moving, contagious disease.
This history also reveals that federal control of quarantine within a state—
displacing an overly restrictive, parochial area quarantine with a uniform
national policy—is consistent with the original intent and understanding of the
federal quarantine statute.

152
The “constitutional moment” concept is associated most famously with Professor Bruce Ackerman.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (arguing that major shifts in
constitutional law can occur when there is sustained popular attention to questions of constitutional
significance). Similarly, there are constitutional principles in the background of the events I describe below.
The upshot being that all three branches of the federal government—Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Executive—at various points during the period I describe all agreed that the national government had a
significant role to play in fighting epidemics threatening more than one state. Moreover, as noted below, many
state governors agreed that the federal government needed interstate quarantine authority, with southern states
taking the lead in asking Congress to authorize and appropriate money for effective federal intervention in
their region.
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A. The First Interstate Quarantine Statute
Congressional authorization for federal intervention to prevent the spread
of disease from state to state dates back to the closing decades of the
nineteenth century. Before considering the historical circumstances that
prompted Congress to act, it is instructive to look at the authorizing language
for federal intervention and trace its evolution to the present. The key language
for this interstate link—when disease threatens to spread “from one State to
another”—has been on the books since 1890.153
The federal government’s interstate quarantine authority has always been
linked to its historical authority over U.S. entry points.154 Outbreaks of yellow
fever, small pox, and cholera in the nineteenth century had been connected to
ports and recently arrived ships.155 Experience proved that disease could be
introduced from abroad, and the federal government had an obligation to assist
states if they failed to stop disease at the borders.156
Initially, medical officers from the Marine Hospital Service were employed
at quarantine inspection stations owned by the national government.157 An
1878 Act clarifying their responsibilities at certain ports contained the proviso
“That there shall be no interference in any manner with any quarantine laws or
regulations as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under State laws.”158
This Act did not address interstate transmission of disease at all, except,
perhaps, by implication—failure to properly quarantine at seaports permitted
introduction and spread of disease inland.
In 1879, proponents of a national quarantine measure, known as the
“Yellow Fever Bill,” justified the federal government’s inland intervention
under its constitutional right to regulate commerce and to protect the country
153
Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31, 31 (1890). I discuss this and other acts of Congress below,
in section IV.C.
154
See generally Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense and Constitutional Constraints, 4 NAT’L SECURITY &
ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 82, 90–91 (2014) (“During the late nineteenth century, however, the balance of
power subtly shifted. The federal government avoided a direct Commerce Clause assertion and, instead, began
to use the power of the purse to buy up local and state ports, transferring their operation to federal control.”);
Price, supra note 33, at 399 (“The question of national control over seaport inspection dominated
congressional debate . . . .”).
155
See Batlan, supra note 4 (describing history of epidemics in the United States).
156
See id. at 62–64 (explaining early federal quarantine laws to prevent infectious disease from entering
port cities).
157
For a general history of the Marine Hospital Service and its evolution into the U.S. Public Health
Service, see Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service: History, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.usphs.gov/aboutus/history.aspx (last updated Sept. 5, 2014).
158
Act of April 29, 1878, ch. 66, 20 Stat. 37, 38.
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from foreign “invader.”159 Opponents of the bill argued that it was
unconstitutional and a violation of state rights.160
Ultimately a much weaker bill emerged. In the wake of the devastating
yellow fever epidemic of 1878, Congress tentatively provided some federal
power to intervene when failure of a state-run port quarantine threatened to
spread disease from state to state. For the first time, Congress distinguished
between “maritime” and “inland” quarantine,161 and this terminology is
significant for later grants of authority. In an Act of Congress creating a
National Board of Health, the Board was to give “special attention . . . to the
subject of quarantine, both maritime and inland, and especially as to
regulations which should be established between State or local systems of
quarantine and a national quarantine system.”162
Later that same year, Congress recognized the need for quarantine rules to
prevent transmission “into one State from another,” laying an interstate
commerce basis for federal authority over inland quarantine.163 This Act,
though, emphasized cooperation with states, rather than any preemptive federal
authority:
That the National Board of Health shall co-operate with and, so far as
it lawfully may, aid State and municipal boards of health in the
execution and enforcement of the rules and regulations of such
boards to prevent the introduction of contagious or infectious
diseases into the United States from foreign countries, and into one
State from another . . . .164

Although the National Board of Health was short-lived, it did set a
precedent for future public health efforts by the federal government. Congress
had given the Board authority to provide money to state and local health
boards “and to assume quarantine powers when states did not appear
competent or willing to do so.”165 As a condition of receipt of federal funds,

159
See Margaret Warner, Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over Southern Public
Health, 1878–1884, 50 J. S. HIST. 407, 412 (1984).
160
Id.
161
Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 202, 20 Stat. 484, 485 (“An act to prevent the introduction of infections or
contagious diseases into the United States, and to establish a National Board of Health”).
162
Id.
163
Act of June 2, 1879, 21 Stat. 5 (“An act to prevent the introduction of contagious or infectious
diseases into the United States”).
164
Id. (emphasis added).
165
Warner, supra note 159, at 413.

PRICE GALLEYPROOFS2

528

3/30/2018 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:491

state and local agencies were required to adopt national standards for
quarantine.166
Following the demise of the National Board of Health, in 1890 Congress
enacted the precursor of the modern federal quarantine statute. This statute was
popularly known as the “Epidemic Diseases Act,” with the full title “An act to
prevent the introduction of contagious diseases from one State to another and
for the punishment of certain offenses.”167 In relevant part, the Act stated:
That whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
President that cholera, yellow-fever, small-pox, or plague exists in
any State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, and that there
is danger of the spread of such diseases into other States, Territories,
or the District of Columbia, he is hereby authorized to cause the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate such rules and regulations as
in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the spread of such
disease . . . and to employ such inspectors and other persons as may
be necessary to execute such regulations to prevent the spread of
such disease.168

The Epidemic Diseases Act also provided criminal penalties for any officer
or agent of the United States, or any common carrier, who should “willfully
violate any of the quarantine laws of the United States or any of the rules and
regulations made and promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.”169
The 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act was unchanged through 1944,170 when
the Public Health Service Act modernized the U.S. Public Health Service and
coordinated its various functions. The key language from the Epidemic
Diseases Act, however, was retained—the Public Health Service Act continued
to authorize federal intervention whenever specified contagious diseases
threatened to spread “from one state . . . into any other State”:171
Sec. 361. (a) The Surgeon General . . . is authorized to make and
enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent
166

Id.
Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31. Preceding this was an Act of Aug. 1, 1888, which
concerned only the establishment of federally operated port quarantine stations, but not displacing those
already operated by some states. Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 727, 25 Stat. 355 (“An Act to Perfect the Quarantine
System of the United States”).
168
Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. at 31 (emphasis added).
169
Id.
170
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 95 (1934) (quoting Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31, with annotated
heading “Regulations to prevent the spread of contagious diseases from one State, etc., to another, etc.,
authorized”); 58 U.S.C.A. § 9176 (Mallory 1916) (same).
171
Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 410, 58 Stat. 703 (July 1, 1944).
167
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the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases
from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one
State or possession into any other State or possession. For purposes
of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General
may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation,
pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so
infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to
human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be
necessary.172

Thus, there is today longstanding congressional authority for some form of
interstate quarantine by the federal government, as the Public Health Service
Act 1944 is the direct predecessor of the current statute, 42 U.S.C. § 264.
B. Yellow Fever Quarantines: “A Stigma Upon Our Institutions and
Civilization”173
What conditions compelled Congress to extend quarantine power inland in
the 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act? The border/inland division of authority we
have today was created at a time when it was believed that epidemics within
the United States could be avoided by securing ports and perfecting a system
of ship quarantine.174 It is true that the main focus of dispute over federal
quarantine authority initially had to do with state control over local seaports.175
In the meantime, before the last states finally ceded control of port quarantine
to the federal government, it was evident that no system of port quarantine was
perfect: Yellow fever inevitably appeared on an annual basis, and with it the
172
Id. The 1944 Public Health Service Act was enacted against the backdrop of World War II, providing
perhaps a wartime justification for interstate quarantine. In other ways, wartime necessity expanded federal
authority in health matters generally. See Polly J. Price, Federalization of the Mosquito: Structural Innovation
in the New Deal Administrative State, 60 EMORY L.J. 325 (2010) (explaining origins of the CDC in war-time
anti-malaria effort).
173
This quote is from a Senate Committee Report reprinted in Annual Report of the Supervising
Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1898, quoted in full
below. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH & MARINE-HOSP. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERVISING SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1898 754 (1899) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1898].
174
See Federal Quarantine Control, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 26, 1906, at 6 (characterizing a
Congressional debate, the article reported “the majority being of the opinion that if the marine hospital service
were given full control of port stations the entrance of disease would be rendered next to impossible”).
175
See Batlan, supra note 4, at 66–67 (“In the wake of additional epidemics, in 1888 Congress provided
half a million dollars to the Marine Hospital Service to build seven federal quarantine stations, which now
competed with state quarantine facilities. . . . Such federal power was soon increased by an act that provided
authority to the Marine Hospital Service to approve state and local quarantine facilities and bring them up to
federal standards. The Service was also charged with enforcing federal quarantine rules. This 1893 law
provided compensation to states that transferred their quarantine facilities to the federal government.”).
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frequent appearance of state and local area quarantines.176 As a result, the
subject of inland quarantine became increasingly urgent. The federal
government was called upon to quell the “shotgun quarantine,” infamous
during frequent epidemics of yellow fever in the late 19th and early 20th
century South.177
In severe yellow fever outbreaks from the 1870s through 1905, the
“shotgun quarantine” became the term used for a state or local government’s
declaration of a quarantine against entry from places thought to be
experiencing an outbreak of yellow fever, to prevent the entry of persons from
anywhere yellow fever might be present.178
A shotgun quarantine consisted of a geographic barrier against “all
persons, whether sick or well,” and any commerce or U.S. Mail that might
attempt to pass through.179 Shotgun quarantines were formal declarations
ordered by governors, mayors, town councils, and other political bodies.180
Armed law-enforcement officers and local volunteers blocked roadways, and
“[t]rains attempting to pass through the cordon would either be stopped before
entering, or not permitted to discharge passengers or cargo” within the state.181
An 1898 article in the Washington Post characterized the problem this
way:
Seriously, this shotgun quarantine system has reached such a stage in
some Southern States that it will surely ruin them unless it is
reformed. In some places it is no longer a justifiable precaution
against possible infection, but a matter of retaliation between county
and parish, city and town. It is a case of “you quarantine us, we’ll
quarantine you,” and some bumptious Board of Health or selfconstituted authority on contagious diseases may be relied upon to
carry out the threat to the letter.182

176

See Price, supra note 33, at 376.
See id. at 371. For another description of state and local quarantines in response to epidemics of
yellow fever, see Batlan, supra note 4, at 65 (“Many residents fleeing infected cities were denied shelter and
some died of starvation and exposure. Hastily erected quarantines at state borders proved ineffective at
curtailing the epidemic but halted commerce throughout the South.”).
178
Price, supra note 33, at 382.
179
See id. at 381.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Southern Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1898, at 6.
177
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But as state and regional efforts to control shotgun quarantines failed,
southern politicians turned to Congress for help.183 For over four decades, the
shotgun quarantine challenged the capacity and will of the federal government
to manage epidemics.184 Congress explored the constitutional question of its
authority to override state quarantines, but never came to a definitive
resolution about how, practically, the federal government could help.185
Southern states insisted there should be a federal role to preempt
unnecessary or retaliatory state and local quarantines because they caused
economic harm and suffering to populations elsewhere.186 Regional solutions
had not worked.187 Business leaders as well as politicians petitioned Congress
for a solution.188 States could not control local health boards, let alone the
actions of neighboring localities, adding to the chaos.189
C. Constitutional Debates and Administrative Hurdles
During the four-decade period of congressional action on matters of
quarantine, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in twice. It first addressed state
and local quarantine in a case involving a yellow fever epidemic in New
Orleans in the 1880s.190 In Morgan’s Steamship v. Board of Health, the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]henever Congress shall undertake to provide for the commercial
cities of the United States a general system of quarantine, or shall
confide the execution of the details of such a system to a National
Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all
State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two
are inconsistent.191

183

Price, supra note 33, at 371.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 397–98.
187
Id. at 394.
188
Id. at 394–98.
189
See Batlan, supra note 4, at 73 (“By the late nineteenth century, many city and county health boards
functioned with extraordinary power to pass a multitude of regulations that might or might not conflict with
state laws. . . . This uneasy and unstable patchwork of local, state, and federal jurisdiction, often entailing
inconsistent laws, produced multiple and repeated conflicts.”).
190
See Morgan’s S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
191
Id. at 464.
184
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The Court’s opinion indicated that the federal government had authority to
establish “a general system of quarantine” under the Commerce Clause.192
Four years later, Congress undertook this displacement of state law with
the 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act. The Act’s language was broad enough to
permit the federal government to intervene inland, including the abrogation of
state quarantines, if it chose to do so.193 The question would become if and
when, not whether the federal government had the authority to abrogate “all
state laws on the subject.”194
Yet any federal response to epidemics after the 1890 Act depended on a
fledgling administrative apparatus with very little funding, staffing, or political
direction. The Marine Hospital Service was still uncertain how to promulgate
enforceable regulations to prevent the local shotgun quarantine. One problem
was how to react swiftly enough, given limited personnel and resources. Even
with a successful federally run quarantine in the Brownsville, Texas area in
1882,195 both the Marine Hospital Service and Congress remained stymied
about how it might improve the situation elsewhere. Handling the yellow fever
situation in south Texas required intensive manpower along with political
savvy to deal with local politicians.196 Replicating that feat throughout the
South proved impossible as state and local quarantines continued to pop up
with regularity whenever yellow fever made its annual appearance.
In annual reports to Congress, the Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital
Service frequently described practical hurdles to lifting state and local shotgun
192
Id. This Article does not evaluate other Commerce Clause jurisprudence arguably relevant to
geographic quarantine of people. For example, in R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1877), the State of
Missouri by statute prevented cattle from Texas to be driven into the state ostensibly to avoid introduction of
bovine disease into cattle already present in Missouri. Although acknowledging the right of a state to inspect
and quarantine diseased cattle, the Missouri legislation was nonetheless invalid: “While we unhesitatingly
admit that a state may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within
its borders; . . . while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection
laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for
its self-protection. It may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden
either foreign or inter-state commerce.” Id. at 472. The Missouri statute at issue, however, forbade all cattle
from Texas for an eight-month period every year. Id. at 469. By contrast, shotgun quarantines were temporary,
intermittent measures, discretionary by health officials based on their determination of public necessity at the
time. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
193
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
194
Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31.
195
See JOHN MCKIERNAN-GONZÁLEZ, FEVERED MEASURES: PUBLIC HEALTH AND RACE AT THE TEXASMEXICO BORDER, 1848–1942 39–49 (2012) (describing a 190-mile-long yellow fever quarantine between
Laredo and Corpus Christi, Texas, set up by the Marine Hospital Service after quarantines were declared
against Brownsville).
196
Id. at 40–41, 43.
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quarantines. For example, the 1898 Surgeon General’s Report contained
several articles detailing the practical impediments to keeping inland travel and
communication open.197 Representative titles included:
Measures to Be Adopted in a District Threatened by Yellow Fever;
Measures to Be Adopted in Infected and Noninfected Towns;
Regulation of Traffic to, from, and Through Infected Towns;
Detention Camps and Camps of Observation;
Train Inspection Service.198
The 1898 Surgeon General’s Report also reprinted, in full, a report of the
Senate Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine from that year.199
The Committee favored legislation bolstering federal regulatory authority
during an epidemic, because “[t]he evils of the present system have become
intolerable”:200
During the season just ended hundreds of lives were lost by reason of
defects in existing law. The commerce of the entire South was
paralyzed, and the rights of citizens disregarded by lawless methods.
Cities and towns were quarantined against rival communities,
producing bitter controversy, and railway trains passing from one
State to another were prohibited from proceeding, the passengers in
many cases being forcibly taken from the cars and carried to
improvised fever camps, where they were exposed to hardship and
contagion.201

The report stated in no uncertain terms the need for federal action to quell
the shotgun quarantine: “The amount of damage inflicted upon the country
by the shotgun quarantine can never be accurately stated, but it certainly
amounted to many millions, and the possibility of its existence is a stigma
upon our institutions and civilization.”202

197

ANNUAL REPORT 1898, supra note 173.
Id. at 9.
199
Id. at 752 (reprinting S. REP. NO. 521 (1897)). A Senate committee to address yellow fever was first
formed in 1878, following the devastating epidemic of that year in New Orleans and the Mississippi valley.
See Chairmen of Senate Standing Committees, 1789–present, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CommitteeChairs.pdf. The Select Committee on Epidemic Diseases
established December 4, 1878, was made a standing committee in 1887. Id. The standing Committee on
Epidemic was created in 1887 and lasted until 1896, when it became the Committee on Public Health and
National Quarantine (terminated in 1921). Id.
200
ANNUAL REPORT 1898, supra note 173, at 753–54.
201
Id. at 754.
202
Id.
198
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The proposed legislation detailed in the Committee’s report would have
permitted federal regulations “to prohibit or permit the movement of vessels,
railway trains, and vehicles, or transportation of persons.”203 Specifically, the
bill provided:
Whenever yellow fever, cholera, plague, or typhus fever has passed
the quarantines of the United States, or in any manner any one of
these diseases has gained entrance or has appeared within the limits
of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, the quarantine
regulations of the United States, prepared under the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of preventing the spread of
such diseases from one State, Territory, or the District of Colombia
into another State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, shall be
supreme and have precedence of State or municipal laws, rules, or
regulations, and the President is authorized to enforce the same and
to control the movements of vessels, railway trains, vehicles, or
persons so as to prevent these diseases from spreading from one
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia to another State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, and to prevent unnecessary
restrictions upon interstate commerce.204

The proposed bill never received a floor vote, despite the Surgeon
General’s plea for more explicit statutory authority to keep transportation
channels open. Facing intransigence by state and local governments, officers of
the Marine Hospital Service frequently were forced to back down in their
efforts to keep open chains of interstate travel and transport.205 With explicit
presidential authority, the Surgeon General and his officers believed they could
be more effective. The Senate Committee on Public Health and National
Quarantine, having studied this very question, believed so as well.206
Earlier bills had also attempted to supplement the federal interstate
quarantine statute with more specific authorization to countermand quarantine
orders of state and local health officials. For example, a bill introduced in the
Senate in 1892 “granting additional quarantine powers” to the Marine Hospital
Service would have permitted the president to “detail an officer or appoint a
proper person” when state or municipal authorities failed or refused to enforce
federal quarantine regulations.207 The bill would have amended the 1890

203

Id.
Id.
205
See id. at 375.
206
See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
207
A Bill Granting Additional Quarantine Powers and Imposing Additional Duties upon the Marine
Hospital Service, S. 2707, 52d Cong. § 3 (as introduced Mar. 24, 1892).
204
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Epidemic Diseases Act, which set forth criminal penalties for state and local
officials who “willfully violate[d] any of the quarantine laws of the United
States,” but did not by its terms allow the president to send federal officers to
directly enforce federal quarantine policy over the objection of states.208
Thus, in the years following the Supreme Court’s 1886 decision in
Morgan’s Steamship, the Marine Hospital Service struggled to form an
administrative apparatus that would permit effective displacement of state
quarantines. Then, in 1902 the Supreme Court once again hinted that Congress
had more authority to nullify state and local quarantines than it had yet to
exercise.
In Louisiana v. Texas,209 the state of Louisiana complained that Texas
routinely closed its borders for its own economic benefit on the pretext of
yellow fever, effectively placing “an embargo on all interstate commerce
between the city of New Orleans and the State of Texas.”210 Rather than a
legitimate public health purpose, it was claimed, Texas acted “to benefit the
commerce of Galveston and of other Texas cities at the expense of the
commerce of New Orleans.”211 Louisiana claimed these quarantines violated
the Commerce Clause.212
The case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.213 In a concurring
opinion, however, Justice John Harlan suggested the federal government might
intervene in these circumstances:
[I]f the allegations of the bill be true, the Texas authorities have gone
beyond the necessities of the situation and established a quarantine
system that is absolutely subversive of all commerce between Texas
and Louisiana, particularly commerce between Texas and New
Orleans. This Court has often declared that the States have the power
to protect the health of their people by police regulations directed to
that end, and that regulations of that character are not to be
disregarded because they may indirectly or incidentally affect
interstate commerce. But when that principle has been announced it
has always been said that the police power of a State cannot be so
exerted as to obstruct foreign or interstate commerce beyond the

208
209
210
211
212
213

Act of March 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31, 31 (1890).
176 U.S.1 (1900).
Texas’ Quarantine Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1900, at 10.
Id.
Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 16, 22.
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necessity for its exercise, and that the courts must guard vigilantly
against needless intrusion upon the field committed to Congress.214

Justice Harlan’s plea extended forcefully for the federal government to act.
The courts would “guard vigilantly”215 to enforce a dormant federal power, but
by the time a court case wound its way through the system it would often be
too late to prevent human suffering and economic harm. The Executive
Branch, by contrast, could act immediately.
Legal scholars also weighed in on the interstate quarantine question. In an
1889 article in the Harvard Law Review, Blewett Harrison Lee opined that
state inland quarantines more often than not ran afoul of the Commerce
Clause.216 He wrote: “The doctrine of the case seems to be that a State police
law which obstructs interstate commerce to a greater extent than is strictly
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the law, is an
unconstitutional regulation of commerce.”217
The question continued to be explored in the coming years. In 1891, a
writer in the American Law Review explained the established understanding of
a state’s police power to protect the health of its residents:
It is well settled, upon the authorities, that the power to establish
quarantine regulations rests with the States and has not been
surrendered to the Federal government. The source of this power lies
in the general right of a State to provide for the health of its people,
and although the power when exercised may, in a greater or less
degree, affect commerce, yet quarantine laws are not enacted for that
purpose, but solely for preserving the public health.218

Other scholars were concerned with increased federal authority over state
quarantine.219 But recognizing that the extent of that authority was not free
from doubt, in 1891 one member of Congress asked:

214

Id. at 23–24 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 24.
216
Blewett Harrison Lee, Limitations Imposed by the Federal Constitution on the Right of the States to
Enact Quarantine Laws, 2 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1889).
217
Id. at 306.
218
H. Campbell Black, The Police Power and the Public Health, 25 AM. L. REV. 170, 181 (1891).
219
See William Hamilton Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L. REV.
45 (1891); John H. Girdner et al., The National Government and the Public Health, 165 N. AM. REV. 733
(1897); James H. McCall, The Quarantine Laws and National Control of Quarantine, 72 MED. NEWS 483
(1898); D.H. Pingrey, Valid State Laws Incidentally Affecting Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 28 CENT. L.J.
336 (1889); U.O.B. Wingate, National Public Health Legislation, 504 N. AM. REV. 527 (1898).
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If the gentleman will read all the decisions, and then undertake to
write down in words exactly where the national power ends and
where the State power begins on this subject of quarantine, he will
accomplish what in my judgment nobody else has yet
accomplished.220

D. Congressional Debates in 1906: Rail Traffic Within States
The last sustained debate in Congress over federal authority for interstate
quarantine occurred in 1906.221 These debates reveal no disagreement with the
federal government’s interstate authority to prevent the spread of disease “from
one state to another.”222 Instead, the debate turned on how best to accomplish
this administratively, in light of the nation’s recent experience with a severe
yellow fever epidemic in 1905.223
In a narrow defeat, a conference committee of Congress rejected a
provision that would have imposed greater federal control over rail travel
within states.224 The rejected provision provided a clearer administrative path
to promulgate and enforce regulations that would lift shotgun quarantines, at
least as it affected rail travel and other common carriers. The section provided:
That every common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, shall,
under such regulations, restrictions, and safeguards as may be
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, receive, carry, and
transport through any State or Territory necessary to complete the
journey or carriage into a State wherein delivery or debarkation may
be lawful, all passengers, freight, or baggage which may have been
discharged and properly certified in accordance with the regulations
of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service; and every person
interfering with or obstructing such carrier or any passenger or any
instrumentality of commerce in any such carriage or journey shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof be punished by a
fine not exceeding $300 or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding
one year, or both, in the discretion of the court . . . .225

This rejected provision would not have expanded existing statutory
authority for interstate quarantine. Instead, it provided explicit backing for
regulatory power over the movement of rail traffic, a practical problem in need
220
221
222
223
224
225

Cowles, supra note 219, at 45 (quoting an unnamed member of the U.S. House of Representatives).
See Price, supra note 33, 414–18 (describing legislative debates over interstate quarantine).
Id. at 417.
Id. at 414–18.
H.R. REP. NO. 59-4290, at 1 (1906) (Conf. Rep.).
59 CONG. REC. 5387, 5389 (1906).
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of an administrative solution. That federal officers were hesitant to enforce
such regulations absent explicit congressional sanction reflected a nascent
administrative agency with little precedent for independent agency action.226
We know that federal inspectors with the Marine Hospital Service already
had substantial experience with monitoring inland rail traffic and negotiating
with state authorities to ameliorate local quarantines. Details in the 1898
Surgeon General’s Report portray an elaborate railroad inspection system
operating at state lines.227 Their aim was to keep trains and the U.S. Mail
moving. The provision rejected in 1906 would have imposed additional
penalties on “every person interfering with or obstructing such carrier or any
passenger or any instrumentality of commerce,” raising the stakes from
liability imposed on the common carrier alone.228 Yet statutory authority
already provided criminal penalties for “any person who shall willfully violate
any rule or regulation” promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury deemed
“necessary to prevent the spread of such disease from one State or Territory
into another.”229 Federal authority already existed to accomplish these aims.
The rejected provision merely made more explicit the federal government’s
pre-existing power to keep rail lines open despite a state or local quarantine.
E. Summary: What History Teaches About Interstate Quarantine
To summarize, the legislative history of the current interstate quarantine
statute makes clear that Congress (and the Supreme Court) envisioned a far
greater role for federal intervention in matters of state quarantine than we
assume today. This history explains the origins of federal interstate quarantine
as a measure to intervene when states imposed geographic quarantines to
protect themselves from disease outside their borders. I have illustrated
instances in which only the federal government could provide for an effective
regional quarantine. There is thus precedent for inland quarantine consistent
with the original understanding of the interstate quarantine statute, sufficient to
lift or nullify a state or local quarantine when needed.

226
The complexity of railway transportation in this period, with numerous lines and companies
crisscrossing the region, is portrayed in JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2001).
227
ANNUAL REPORT 1898, supra note 173, at 389–411 (“Train-Inspection Service”).
228
59 CONG. REC. at 5389 (1906). The 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act imposed penalties only on “any
common carrier or officer, agent, or employee of any common carrier,” while the rejected provision would
have imposed those penalties on anyone interfering with a common carrier as well. See Epidemic Diseases Act
of 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31, § 3 (1890).
229
Epidemic Diseases Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 31 at § 1.
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What else can we conclude from the legislative history? It is clear that
power over quarantine as provided in the 1890 Epidemic Diseases Act meant
much more than merely detaining persons at risk of spreading disease. It
encompassed the whole apparatus of disease prevention as it was understood
and practiced then—fumigation, inspection, and abatement, in addition to
physical barriers excluding persons within or outside a particular area.
Congress provided the Marine Hospital Service with substantial authority to
nullify state and local shotgun quarantines, but not the administrative ability to
do so effectively. There was widespread agreement that the Commerce Clause
authorized such actions, even with the more limited view of federalism at the
time.
Compared to today, of course, it was also a time of simpler transportation,
before automobiles and airplanes. But interstate travel then was nonetheless
sufficiently complicated that federal public health officers were frustrated by
an inability to lift quarantines imposed by municipalities within a state. What
was needed was not more statutory authority, but a more robust federal agency
capacity.
Yet the statutory authority was clear. There was widespread agreement that
only the federal government could evaluate whether state or local quarantines
were a pretext for commercial advantage or reflected unwarranted panic, or
whether such quarantines were legitimately needed to stem spread of the
disease. Only the federal government had the financial and administrative
resources to work regionally to govern parochial local interests. Only the
federal government could prevent chaos and suffering when “[m]ob law
seem[ed] likely to rule” in any given state.230 In short, yellow fever epidemics
in the South provided the backdrop for Congress to establish federal authority
to preempt or nullify a state quarantine in these extreme situations.231 That the
United States has not experienced such situations since the era of yellow fever
does not lessen the federal government’s authority today.
CONCLUSION
Can we imagine a modern-day scenario equivalent to the yellow fever
shotgun quarantine? Yellow fever was our closest experience to the kind of
chaos that a fast-moving, lethal epidemic might cause today. The 1918
230
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH & MARINE-HOSP. SERV., DOCUMENT NO. 2456,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1883 284 (1883) (describing effects of local shotgun quarantines).
231
Id. at 285, 305.
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pandemic flu, by contrast, saw no massive relocation of people as “refugees”
from the disease, no closing of state borders, or quarantine of entire towns.
Since interstate quarantine authority was first established by Congress in
1890, advances in medical science provide many more tools to combat
infectious disease. There have also been enormous changes in state and federal
capacity to respond to public health emergencies.232 Both factors make it less
likely that such scenes might be repeated or that federal intervention might be
needed.
An important part of state capacity is the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC), a framework for mutual aid among states in the
event of a natural disaster or other emergency.233 The need for such a
framework arose in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina
(2005).234 EMAC, ratified by Congress in 1996, now includes all fifty states
and U.S. territories.235 It is based on voluntary undertakings by one state at the
request of another. The EMAC framework does not, however, contemplate the
coordination of state and local quarantine policy in the event of a multi-state
epidemic, or mandate what is otherwise voluntary cooperation in the event
states impose conflicting quarantine policies.
Nonetheless, while most states have made great strides in preparation and
readiness for public health emergencies, weaknesses remain, including
insufficient incentives for cooperation and inadequate regional planning.
Clearly, it would be preferable for any exercise of federal interstate quarantine
authority to be with the cooperation of state and local governments. But with
current CDC resources and capabilities, population density, and modern speed
of transportation and communication, broader authority for the CDC could
better serve state interests (recognizing that some federalism trade-off is
inevitable).

232
For an overview of preparedness resources at both the state and national level, see Public Health
Emergency, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/Pages/default.aspx (last
reviewed Oct. 6, 2017); Public Health Law Program: Emergency Preparedness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/emergency.html (last updated Aug. 1, 2017);
Public Health Preparedness, NAT’L ASS’N CTY. & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, http://archived.naccho.org/topics/
emergency (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
233
See What Is EMAC?, EMERGENCY MGMT. ASSISTANCE COMPACT, https://www.emacweb.org/index.
php/learn-about-emac/what-is-emac (last visited Dec. 8, 2017) (describing EMAC operations and history).
234
History, EMERGENCY MGMT. ASSISTANCE COMPACT, https://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learnabout-emac/emac-history (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
235
What Is EMAC?, supra note 234.
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The emphasis on quarantine to stem a future epidemic is sometimes said to
be overblown. In any public health emergency, the goal is to avoid the use of
area or group quarantine as much as possible. To do so, preparedness and
resources at all levels of government will be key. For example, the WHO
recommends ongoing public health strategies for the prevention and control of
communicable diseases, including immunization, mass drug distribution, food
safety, safe water and sanitation, and vector control.236 Similarly, the CDC’s
“Framework for Preventing Infectious Diseases” emphasizes infectious disease
surveillance and epidemiologic investigation, together with identification and
implementation of high-impact public health interventions and policies to
prevent, detect, and control infectious diseases.237 Fears of a widespread
epidemic may be overblown as well, based on the relative strength of U.S.
healthcare and scientific research as well as confidence in the nation’s ability
to produce vaccines.
If the nation were better prepared regionally, the necessity for federal
intervention might never arise. Dedicated funds set aside for national
emergencies, for example, could be distributed regionally to ease the
jurisdictional clashes that might arise between states. However, the most
significant federal preparedness legislation, passed in 2002, does not by its
terms support grants to “regions,” just state and local health departments.238
This is one reason we should be concerned about how the CDC is funded to
respond to public health emergencies. In a recent article addressing this, the
authors explain the appropriation process, identifying challenges in funding
presented by the political process in both Congress and the Executive.239
There are other ways the CDC can intervene in state public health matters
short of nullifying state health orders. One example is to provide trustworthy
epidemiology reports when a local government might have an incentive to
underreport the existence of contagious disease. In the recent Zika outbreak,
the government of Puerto Rico allegedly underreported the number of Zika

236
World Health Organization [WHO], WHO Recommended Strategies for the Prevention and Control
of Communicable Diseases, at 17, WHO/CDS/CPE/SMT/2001.13 (2012), apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
67088/1/WHO_CDS_CPE_SMT_2001.13.pdf.
237
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, A CDC FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES: SUSTAINING THE ESSENTIALS AND INNOVATING FOR THE FUTURE iii (2011).
238
“The [National Preparedness for Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies Act] authorizes
grants to state and local health departments and hospitals to improve planning and preparedness activities,
enhance laboratory capacity, and educate and train health care personnel.” C. STEPHEN REDHEAD ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31263, PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE ACT: PROVISIONS AND CHANGES TO PREEXISTING LAW 3 (2002).
239
Fischer et al., supra note 44.
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cases, ostensibly to avoid discouraging travel to the island.240 The CDC issued
a travel alert that remained in place even after the government of Puerto Rico
declared the outbreak over.241 Travel alerts, warnings, and other public
information activities by the CDC can alleviate local government
shortcomings. Zika is our most recent epidemic concern, but the nature of the
disease means traditional tools of quarantine and isolation are not relevant or
helpful.242 Travel warnings are probably the preferred mechanism anyway, so
long as data is reliable and the public trusts the information it receives.
Any intervention by the federal government over the objections of a state
or territory can be highly politically charged. Environmental, scientific, and
medical recommendations can be hijacked for political purposes at any level of
government. Perhaps the most pressing problem is a crisis of trust in
governmental institutions. The political conflict we saw over Ebola does not
bode well for “the big one” that scientists widely expect to strike eventually—a
fast-spreading, airborne virus such as SARS or swine flu.243
To restate the questions I am concerned with: What are the limits of the
federal government’s interstate quarantine power? In what circumstances, if
ever, might the federal government step in to lift a state’s protective quarantine
that has no medical justification? When might it be helpful for the CDC to be
the final authority on a national quarantine policy, especially when that might
entail overriding a quarantine that a state governor has imposed?
While I have provided some examples, some reaching back in history and
others more recent, my goal is to encourage further inquiry rather than to
propose specific models—to illustrate fault lines in the limitation of interstate
quarantine authority as it is currently understood. Neither the current statutory
or regulatory authorities, nor how we have thought about it in the past, prevent
us from envisioning a different future for national quarantine policy. While
statutory and regulatory authorities already exist, more explicit authorization
and guidelines could be helpful not only to encourage structured thinking about
the issue, but also to encourage regional cooperation to cabin the need for
federal intervention in the first place.
240
See Helen Branswell, Feud Erupted Between CDC, Puerto Rico over Reporting of Zika Cases,
Document Shows, STAT (May 1, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/05/01/zika-virus-puerto-rico-cdc/.
241
Julie Steenhuysen, Puerto Rico Declares Zika Outbreak Over, CDC Maintains Travel Warning,
REUTERS, June 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-zika-puertorico/puerto-rico-declares-zikaoutbreak-over-cdc-maintains-travel-warning-idUSKBN18W2SU.
242
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
243
Sanjay Gupta, The Big One Is Coming, and It’s Going to Be a Flu Pandemic, CNN (Sept. 14, 2017,
12:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/index.html.
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In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a “wellordered society” must be able to enforce “reasonable regulations” in
responding to “an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members.”244 The primary responsibility, as it should be, is with states as the
first line of defense. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that “the
power of the States to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the
protection of the health of their inhabitants . . . is beyond question.”245
The strength of our response to a public health threat depends on the
existence of high-quality institutions with substantial ability to coordinate.
These need more insulation from political control. One improvement would be
an expansion of the federal government’s quarantine authority within the
United States, under the direction of the CDC. Even though the CDC and the
U.S. Public Health Service are among the best health agencies in the world,
federal law retains much of the same disease-prevention architecture it had
more than a century ago. There are a number of ways this could change, but an
important step would be to expand our understanding of interstate quarantine
authority so that, when necessary, the federal government could referee state
and local conflicts over quarantine. These conflicts can occur when
uninformed or excessive panic drives political decisions in a manner
detrimental to effective control of a national epidemic.

244
245

197 U.S. 11, 27, 29 (1905).
Compagnie Francaise De Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).

